Carscadden

Appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing with prejudice appellant’s claim to property escheated to the Territory of Alaska, after demurrer had beén sustained to the petition and appellant’s refusal to plead further.

One Sarah Carscadden, in 1903, was committed to an asylum for the insane. Her son, who is the appellant, left the Territory of Alaska in 1911, and has been absent therefrom since that time.

By § 1, Ch. 40, Alaska Session Laws 1921, it was declared that: “When any person shall die intestate, without heirs, leaving real or personal property in the Territory, the same shall escheat to and become the property of the territory.” By § 3, it was provided that: “Whenever the administrator of any estate shall find that his intestate left no heirs, or shall, after due search fail to find that his intestate left heirs, such facts shall be certified by the administrator to the probate court, and it shall then be the duty of the latter, as soon as the administrator’s final account is settled, to enter a decree adjudging that all the balance of the estate, whether real or personal property, has escheated to and become the property of the Territory.” See Compiled Laws of Alaska,…

(dissenting).

I dissent.

After certain monies had been ordered escheated to the Territory of Alaska, the statute limiting the time for bringing action for the recovery of escheated money was shortened from ten to seven years. From the effective date of the amendment the claimant herein had over two years of the seven provided by the amendment within which to bring his action. He did not bring his action within this time but did bring it within the ten year period which was in force at the time of the escheating order. [See main opinion for additional facts.] The Alaskan court held that the statute had run against the action.

The majority have concluded that the trial court’s judgment, though not manifestly erroneous is nevertheless wrong. They believe it to be their duty to follow and apply the holding in Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596 , 84 U.S. 596 , 21 L.Ed. 737 , that of three separate methods of applying the statute in similar circumstances, the one which extends the time for the full period of the limitation from the date of the amendment is, or appears to be, the most reasonable. Accordingly, they apply this rule. The cited case, however, does not hold that it is…