Pennie

The respondent, as administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Charles McLaughlin, brought this action to quiet the title to several tracts of land. Each tract of land in controversy is made the subject of a separate count of the complaint. Each of the counts after the first refers to the first count, and alleges that certain paragraphs therein which are necessary to the sufficiency of each count are true, instead -of restating such facts. The complaint was unverified. There was a demurrer to the complaint on several grounds; among others, that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the several causes of action were improperly joined. The demurrer was overruled. The defendant Harper, who alone appeals, answered by a general denial, and by way of affirmative defense set up that he and the deceased Hildreth entered into a contract of copartnership for the purpose of “buying and selling cattle, and of buying and selling cattle ranches.” This contract is set out as a part of the answer, and contains this clause: “The purchase of lands shall be confined to the lands in Fresno County known as the Hildreth and Jones ranches, and *129…

I concur in the judgment, and in the opinion of the court, except that part of it which states that “each count of a pleading must state a cause of action, and be complete within itself, without reference to any other count.” There are cases where several counts are proper and necessary, and where numerous averments of the same facts are necessary to the completeness of each count. In such cases, where the averments of such facts in the first count are referred to in the succeeding counts in a clear and methodical manner, and incorporated by such reference, I see no necessity of rewriting them several times, and thus making the complaint unnecessarily cumbersome. It should be done, of course, clearly, and without uncertainty in the reference; but I do not think that the rule should be laid down that it cannot be done at all