O'Neil

Action on the following promissory note:—

Defense, the statute of limitations. The action was commenced more than nine years after the date of the note. The only question in the case is as to the time when the note matured and the statute commenced to run.

The court below held that the action was barred, and rendered judgment for the defendant.

*633 The appellant concedes that if this is a note payable “on demand,” the same matured immediately, and the statute had run. But it is contended that as the note was made payable “on demand after date," it could not have matured at once, and that therefore an actual demand was necessary to put the statute in motion. The general rule is, that a note payable on demand is due immediately, without an actual demand, and that the statute commences to run at once. (Brummagim v. Tallant, 29 Cal. 506 ; 89 Am. Dec. 176 ; Cousins v. Partridge, 79 Cal. 228 ; Story on Promissory Notes, sec. 29; Angelí on Limitations, sec. 59; Wood on Limitations, sec. 124.)

The language used in the note under consideration does not take it out of this rule. In Hitchings v. Edmands, 132 Mass. 338 , the court said: “The words ‘on demand after date’ are more…