This action was brought in the court below upon a judgment theretofore entered in the Territorial Court of Yukon Territory, Canada, for $6,270.96, and costs taxed at $248.60, in an action there brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, upon an account for goods and merchandise sold and delivered to him by the plaintiff, and upon a promissory note for $2,610.69, with interest, executed by the defendant to one Milan, and by him afterwards assigned to the plaintiff.

In the complaint filed in the court below the plaintiff joined with the count upon the Canadian judgment counts for the goods and merchandise sold and delivered to the defendant, and upon the promissory note executed by him to Milan, and by the latter assigned to the plaintiff. The court below, on the motion of the defendant, struck from the complaint the counts upon the promissory note and for the goods and merchandise, on the ground that they were merged in the judgment, and were therefore irrelevant and immaterial.

In his amended answer the defendant denied all of the allegations of the complaint, except that in respect to the corporate capacity of the plaintiff, and also set up in defense that the Canadian court that gave the judgment sued upon in this action never acquired jurisdiction of the defendant; that at the time that action was commenced the defendant was an actual bona fide resident of the District of Alaska, United States of America, and a native-born citizen of the United States, and was not in the Territory of Yukon, Dominion of Canada, and had no notice or knowledge of the action in the Dominion of Canada until the summons and complaint in the present action were served upon him; *478 that the defendant did not own any property, real or personal, in Yukon Territory, Dominion of Canada, at the time the action there was commenced, and that no summons, complaint, process, or notice of any kind in that action was ever served upon the defendant, personally or by publication, or upon any person authorized to admit service of process for the defendant; that he never appeared in that action, either in person or by attorney; and that no order for service of summons or process by publication was ever made by the Territorial Court of Yukon Territory, Canada, in the said action.

The plaintiff filed a reply to the amended answer of the defendant, alleging, among other things, that at the time of the commencement of the action against the defendant in the Territorial Court of Yukon Territory it was provided by the Consolidated Ordinances of the Northwest Territories, which ordinances were by “An act to provide for the government of the Yukon District, Canada,” passed by Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, and assented, to June 13, 1898, made the laws in and for the said Yukon Territory, Canada, that personal service of the writ of summons in actions pending in the court of the said territory. shall be effected by copy by personal service anywhere in the territory, and in case any defendant is out of the territory, but has an agent, managing clerk, or other representative resident and carrying on his business within the same, service may be made upon such agent, managing clerk, or other representative; that in the month of September, 1900, the defendant nominated and appointed Albert W. Debney his true and lawful agent, representative, and attorney, to represent him and transact all his business in Yukon Territory, Canada, which appointment has never been revoked, and still remains in full force and effect; that the writ of summons and statement of claim in the action there brought were duly served upon the defendant by delivering copies thereof to the said Albert W. Debney, defendant’s agent, attorney, and representative in Yukon Territory, and that the amended statement of claim and writ of summons were duly served upon the said defendant in the same manner; that service of all the said papers was duly and regularly made by the defendant in accordance *479 with the laws in force in Yukon Territory, Canada, at the time of making the same; and that evidence of the service of the amended statement of claim and writ of summons was produced before the Territorial Court of Yukon Territory, which court at the rendition of its judgment had full and complete jurisdiction of the person of the defendant under and by virtue of those laws.

The plaintiff also moved the court for leave to file an amended complaint, in which it more fully and specifically stated the counts upon the promissory note alleged to have been executed by the defendant to Milan and by him assigned to the plaintiff, and the count for the goods and merchandise alleged to have been sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, constituting the causes of action upon which the Canadian judgment was obtained, and which it desired to join with the count upon that judgment in the court below. The court, however, refused to allow the amended complaint to be filed, and proceeded to the trial of the cause.

Upon the conclusion of all of the evidence the plaintiff again asked leave of the court to file its said amended complaint, which motion was also denied; the court still holding that the causes of action upon the note and upon the open account were merged in the Canadian judgment and that that judgment was conclusive upon the merits, but was, among other things, open to attack upon the question of jurisdiction. And the court below finally held that that judgment was void, for the reason that there was never any service of process upon the defendant, and accordingly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint upon the merits, with costs to the defendant.

The force and effect of foreign judgments was very carefully considered by the Supreme Court in the cases of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 , 16 S.Ct. 139 , 40 L.Ed. 95 , and Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 , 16 S.Ct. 171 , 40 L.Ed. 133 . After a most elaborate review of the decisions and text-writers, the majority of the court said, in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 202 , 16 S.Ct. 158 , 40 L.Ed. 95 : “In view of all the authorities upon the subject, and of the trend of judicial opinion in this country and in England, following the lead of Kent and Story, we are satis *480 fied that where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial provided, before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial by regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact. The defendants therefore cannot be permitted, upon that general ground, to contest the validity or the effect of the judgment sued on.”

But the court proceeded to show that such judgment may be impeached upon certain other grounds, saying, among other things: “It must, however, always be kept 'in mind that- it is the paramount duty of the court, before which any suit is brought, to see to it that the parties have had a fair and impartial trial before a final decision is. rendered against either party. When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court having-jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that, by the principles of international law, and by the comity of our own country, it should not be given full credit and effect.” 159 U.S. 205 , 16 S.Ct. 159 , 40 L.Ed. 95 .

*481 In that particular case, in which a judgment of a court of France was involved, it was held not to be entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but only to be considered as prima facie evidence of the justice of the plaintiff’s claim, for the reason that by the laws of France our own judgments are there reviewable upon the merits, whereas the opposite effect must be here given to the judgment of an English court, for the reason that the law of England holds conclusive upon the merits a judgment of an American court, with the limitations and qualifications already indicated in respect to the want of jurisdiction, fraud, etc.

In the case in hand the sole objection made to the validity of the judgment in the case between these parties in the Territorial Court of Yukon Territory is the lack of service of process issued in that case upon the defendant.

The evidence shows that the Canadian statute applicable to the case provides, among other things, as follows:

Consolidated Ordinances of the Northwest Territories of Canada 1898, p. 198.

The Canadian judgment roll introduced in evidence in the court below shows as the cause of the plaintiff’s action there this statement of claim:

The affidavit of service of the statement of claim and writ of summons, omitting the caption, is as follows:

The statement of claim was, according to the record, amended on Nov. 7, 1902, the affidavit of service of which amended statement, together with the. summons, is as follows :

As has been said, the only point made against the validity of that judgment is that the service of the claim and summons was made on A. W. Debney, who, it is contended by the defendant and was held by the court below, was not “an agent, managing clerk, or 'other representative [of the defendant], resident and carrying on his business within” the Yukon Territory, and therefore not a person upon whom a valid service could, under the Canadian statute, be made. The court below said in its opinion: “The real question in this case is one of fact. Was the defendant, after he left Dawson and returned to Alaska, represented in the Yukon Territory by Alfred W. Debney as ‘an agent, managing clerk, or other representative, resident and carrying on his business’? If Alfred W. Debney was such an agent when the summons and claim were so served upon him in the fall of 1902, the Yukon court had jurisdiction; otherwise not.”

The court below proceeded to consider the testimony upon that question saying: “The only testimony in this case, touching the business of the defendant in the Yukon Territory at the time this service was made, was given by defendant himself. His testimony was that about September, 1900, he sold all his mining property and all other interests in Yukon Territory, near Dawson, and returned to Alaska, where he has ever since resided, and that since said date he has had no business or property of any kind in *486 Yukon Territory. Plaintiff offered no evidence in denial of defendant’s statements, but on cross-examination offered some letters written in 1902, about the time the suit was brought in the Yukon courts, signed by A. W. Debney as the attorney in fact of defendant, to show that the agent was so acting for him. The evidence disclosed that a half interest in a valuable mining claim had remained in the name of an agent of plaintiff when defendant left Dawson; that defendant had sold that, with all other claims, to A. W. Debney; that plaintiff had refused to transfer it to A. W. Debney until a bill which they held against defendant for interest was paid; and that to secure himself A. W. Debney paid that amount and was credited by defendant for so doing. This is the only act of business which the evidence shows the agent to have done, except to demand the transfer of the half interest from plaintiff to himself, and falls far short of proving that the agent was carrying on defendant’s business. It only proves that A. W. Debney was attending to his own business — that he procured possession of the half interest in the mine for himself, and not for the defendant. It must not be forgotten, either, that, while the letters are admitted on cross-examination to have been in the handwriting of A.5 W. Debney, they did not prove the facts stated in them, and these facts are explained or denied by defendant in line with his general evidence. Clearly, the preponderance of the evidence is with the defendant, and sustains his claim that A. W. Debney was not at the time of the service, or at any subsequent period, his ‘agent, managing clerk, or other representative resident, carrying on his business within’ Yukon Territory. He was armed with a power of attorney from defendant for the purpose of aiding him to reduce to his own possession property purchased by him from the defendant. It is my judgment that the service was void, and gave the Yukon court no jurisdiction, because it was not made in compliance with section 14, order 3, upon an agent carrying on defendant’s business.”

We do not think the court below drew the right contusions from the defendant’s testimony. It is true that he testified in effect, on direct examination, that prior to leaving Dawson and returning to the United States, about September, 1900, he sold all of his interests in Yukon Ter *487 ritory, and that since that date he has had no business or property of any kind therein. But we are of the opinion that, when the whole of the defendant’s testimony is read and considered, it very clearly appears therefrom, even without the aid of other evidence in the case, that such was not the fact, but that, on the contrary, he did retain certain business interests in Yukon Territory, the management and handling of which he intrusted to his brother, A. W. Debney, by the following written power of attorney, which was introduced in evidence:

In the course of the direct examination of the defendant he testified that he left Yukon Territory in September or October, 1900, and that at no time during the year 1902 was he in any portion of the Dominion of Canada; that at the time he left there he did not have any property or business of any kind or character in that territory, and had no agent or representative there in charge of any such interests; that the first he ever heard of the action against him in the Territorial Court of Yukon Territory was from a letter received from his brother, informing him that judgment had been entered against him. On cross-examination the defendant testified that he first went to Yukon Territory in 1896, arriving at Dawson on the 2d day of June of that year, and remained there until September or October of 1900. He admitted the execution to his brother. A. W. Debney, of the power of attorney above set out, in respect to which he testified on cross-examination:

The defendant was then asked in respect to three letters, which he testified were in the hand writing of his brother, signed by him as attorney in fact for the defendant. The defendant also admitted in his testimony that “8 Below Upper Discovery” means Dominion creek. The three letters last referred to are as follows:

On his redirect examination the defendant testified that he never authorized any one to accept service of process for him in the Yukon Territory, and that he never authorized his brother, A. W. Debney, to enter into an agreement with the Alaska Commercial Company for it to take judgment by default against him, and that he did not have any business or interests of any kind or character in the Yukon Territory during any portion of the year 1902. Upon his recross-examination he was questioned, and answered, among other things, as follows:

A part, at least, of the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant, according to his own testimony, grew out of business transactions between the parties in Yukon Territory, and in the course of his mining operations there. He had transferred to an agent of the plaintiff, as security for his indebtedness, an interest in a mining claim on Dominion creek. Certainly, the matter of that indebtedness had not, according to the defendant’s own testimony, been settled when, he left the territory, and it is equally certain that before leaving he appointed his brother, A. W. Debney, his attorney to represent him in that territory and transact any and all business relating to his interests therein. We think it clear that the evidence shows, *497 without any substantial conflict, that A. W. Debney was the defendant’s agent and legal representative, within the meaning of the provision of the Canadian statute in question, and that the service upon him in the action there brought was a valid service, and, accordingly, that the judgment there rendered was a valid judgment. It results that the judgment of the court below must be reversed, without reference to the other questions discussed by counsel.

The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.