Opinion by Judge LEGGE; Dissent by Judge KLEINFELD.

A class of women prisoners incarcerated in Oregon state prison allege that the Oregon State Department of Corrections discriminates against women inmates in providing educational and vocational opportunities, in violation of Title IX and its regulations, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1 et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Following trial, the district court ruled against plaintiffs on all but one of their claims. Plaintiffs appeal, claiming that the district court erred in holding that: (1) Title IX requires only “parity” rather than “equality” in prison educational programs; (2) Title IX violations are subject to the defense of “penological necessity”; and (3) gender discrimination in prisons does not violate the Equal Protection Clause when it is “reasonably related to a legitimate penological goal.” Plaintiffs ask that the case be remanded to the district court for further factual findings using the correct legal standards.

Defendants cross-appeal from the district court’s holding that plaintiffs were not required to prove “discriminatory intent” in order to establish a violation of the Title IX regulations. Defendants also appeal from the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs.

The appeals present difficult issues of the application of Title IX, which prohibits gender discrimination in education, to state prison systems. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. Anderson v. United States, 966 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir.1992). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Women prisoners incarcerated in the Oregon Women’s Correctional Center (OWCC) initiated this class action ten years ago. They allege discrimination in six educational and vocational training programs in the Oregon penal system: prison industries, a forest camp, a farm annex, apprenticeships, vocational programs, and college courses. The class seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Oregon state prison facilities include (1) the Oregon State Penitentiary (OSP), a maximum security facility for men with approximately 1800 inmates; (2) the Oregon State Correctional Institution (OSCI), a medium security facility for men with approximately 1000 inmates; (3) OWCC, a medium security facility for women with approximately 200 inmates; (4) the Eastern Oregon Corrections Institute (EOCI), a medium security facility for men with approximately 1200 inmates; (5) a Farm Annex where 225 male inmates live and work; and (6) a Forest Work Camp for approximately 110 male inmates.

The Oregon penal system provides educational and vocational programs for its inmates. But men and women have access to different programs. For example, there are two vocational classes offered at OWCC, while there are twelve each at OSP and *1223 OSCI. Women may attend vocational classes with men at OSCI, but they must be searched in order to travel between prisons and often arrive late for classes. 1 There are no apprenticeship programs at OWCC. Women may participate in certain apprenticeship programs at OSCI, but may not participate in the mechanical trade apprenticeship programs. Male inmates may request transfers to different institutions to participate in different programs, but these transfer requests are generally denied because of prison overcrowding.

II.

After a non-jury trial in 1986, the district court found in favor of plaintiffs on one issue and in favor of defendants on all other issues. The plaintiff class appealed, arguing that certain procedural errors prejudiced the trial. We reversed and remanded on procedural grounds. Jeldness v. Watson, 857 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir.1988). But that decision did not resolve any of the substantive issues.

On remand, defendants moved for summary judgment. In its well-considered order on the motion, the district court ruled on the applicable legal standards governing plaintiffs’ claims under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The court held (1) that gender based classifications which were “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” did not violate the Equal Protection Clause; (2) in a prison context, Title IX requires gender “parity” rather than “equality” or “identity” of treatment; (3) a showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary for plaintiffs to prevail under the regulations to Title IX; and, (4) “penological necessity” is a complete defense to gender based disparate impact under Title IX. ■ The district court entered partial summary judgment for defendants.

Following a non-jury trial using those legal standards, the court made extensive findings of fact and entered judgment for defendants on all but one of plaintiffs’ claims. The court ruled that defendants had violated Title IX regulations by paying men, but not women, for vocational training. Judgment was entered for plaintiffs on that claim, and the court also awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs. The court made the following rulings as to each of the six programs:

Prison Industries

The district court found on summary judgment that any differences in the availability of particular jobs or work programs were related to custody status, not to gender. The court also found after trial that any disparities in pay were related to market forces rather than gender.

Forest Camp

The court granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on the penological necessity defense. The court found that women are excluded from the forest camp because mixed gender crews could cause safety problems in this wilderness setting, where inmates restore forests and fight fires with minimal supervision. The court also held that defendants had not violated the Equal Protection Clause, because of the substantial governmental interest in excluding women from the camp. And it held that defendants did not violate Title IX, because of the “substantial legitimate penological necessity of separately housing prisoners by sex.”

Farm Annex

The court granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on the penological necessity defense. In its summary judgment order, the court found that women could work at the annex; and that any disparity in the availability of programs or jobs there was attributable to the fact that women could not reside there, which was “justified by the substantial legitimate penological necessity of separately housing inmates on the basis of sex.” At trial, the court stated that the women’s level of participation depended primarily on factors other than gender, but that “any distinction in job assignments at the farm annex relate to supervision and security concerns and are the result of a legitimate penological necessity.”

Apprenticeships

The court entered judgment for defendants following trial, based on the penological *1224 necessity defense. Although women are permitted to participate in some apprenticeship programs at the men’s prison, no woman has ever applied to do so. However, the court found that prior to 1990 women were not informed of the apprenticeship opportunities. 2 Women can participate in five vocational trade apprenticeships at OSCI, but cannot participate in the four mechanical trade apprenticeships at OSCI (welding, painting, cabinet making, plumbing) because of security or supervision problems. The court concluded that defendants excluded women from the mechanical trade apprenticeships because of legitimate penological necessity.

Vocational Programs

Following trial, the court entered judgment for defendants on the availability of vocational programs, finding that the programs were “equal in substance and form,” although not exactly the same. The court found that “any discrepancies in equal availability” were the result of “legitimate peno-logical necessity.”

OWCC offers two vocational courses, cosmetology and office administration. Women may take an additional 12 classes at OSCI. The court found that this allocation of courses did not “reflect gender based stereotypes” but was based on the size of the prisons. The court found that because women often arrived late at OSCI, it took some women longer than men to complete the courses. Women are also subject to skin searches when exiting and entering OSCI for their classes. The court held that these disparities are justified by the defense of legitimate penological necessity.

The court entered judgment for plaintiffs on their Title IX claim that men, but not women, were awarded merit pay for vocational work. The court found that the prison policy of awarding merit pay did not constitute intentional discrimination, and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. However, the court found that the regulations to Title IX do not require proof of discriminatory intent to establish liability, and therefore entered judgment against defendants on that claim.

College Courses

At trial the court found as a fact that college level educational opportunities for women are “equal to or greater than” educational opportunities for men. Although there are fewer lower division courses offered to women than to men, the court found that women do not take longer to get a degree, and that the ratio of classes per inmates is greater at OWCC. The court also found that women have equal access to admission to upper division courses.

III.

Do the requirements of Title IX apply to educational programs in state prisons?

Title IX provides, in relevant part, that “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...” 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a). The Oregon penal system receives federal financial assistance.

Whether Title IX applies to state prisons receiving federal funding is a question of first impression in this circuit. The problem of applying a statute which generally forbids gender based distinctions to prisons are significant, given this country’s long-standing history of sex-segregated prisons. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 326 , 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2725 , 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). And plaintiffs here do not challenge the general policy of maintaining single-sex prisons. However, neither party has cited, nor could this court find, any case holding that the broad language of Title IX is not applicable to prisons. And two district courts have specifically allowed Title IX suits against state prisons. Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F.Supp. 174 (W.D.Ken.1982), vacated on other grounds, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir.1989); *1225 Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F.Supp. 931 (M.D.Pa. 1986).

Starting with the language of the statute itself, Title IX on its face applies to “any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” with certain statutory exceptions. The statute exempts religious schools, military and merchant marine schools, fraternities, sororities, voluntary youth organizations, and beauty pageants, among others. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(3)-(9). There is no exemption for correctional institutions. When a statute lists specific exemptions, other exemptions are not to be judicially implied. Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 , 100 S.Ct. 1905, 1910-11 , 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980). Title IX was amended twice since the two above-cited district courts applied Title IX to prisons. But Congress did not add an exemption for prisons. See Canterino, 546 F.Supp. 174 ; Beehler, 664 F.Supp. 931 ; Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986, 46 U.S.C. 2000d-7; Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, P.L. 100-259.

Prisons are specifically, if briefly, mentioned in the legislative history of Title IX. The Senate Report for the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which clarified that Title IX and several other civil rights statutes applied to an entire institution receiving federal funds, and not just to the specific program or activity receiving the money, stated “Prolonged debate takes place over what constitutes a ‘program or activity’ under the civil rights law, while the universities, schools and correctional facilities receive millions of federal dollars.” (emphasis added) S.Rep. No. 100-64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.Code & Admin. News 3, 13. 3

Thus, we agree with the district court below, and with the court in Canterino, which stated:

Canterino, 546 F.Supp. at 210 .

The statute, the case law, and the legislative history all suggest that Title IX should apply to prisons; there is no contrary authority. Thus, although the application of Title IX’s requirements must be analyzed in the context of the prison environment, state prisons which receive federal financial assistance are bound by the mandates of Title IX. The application of those mandates is discussed below.

Defendants argue for the first time on appeal that Title IX does not apply to the *1226 farm annex, the forest work camp, or the prison industries because they are not “educational” programs within the meaning of Title IX. This is a factual issue. Since the case is being remanded to the district court, this argument can be considered by that court.

IV.

Defendants argue that the regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services under Title IX do not apply to prisons, because the regulations were not written with prisons in mind. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1 et seq. Defendants contend that the regulations assume co-educational facilities and freedom of movement, and that the regulations were written for “kindergarten through high school” and not for prisons.

However, it is clear that the regulations are not meant to. apply only to traditional educational institutions. The stated purpose of the regulations “is to effectuate Title IX ... which is designed to eliminate (with certain exceptions) discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, whether or not such program or activity is offered or sponsored by an educational institution ...” 45 C.F.R. § 86.1 (emphasis added).

Title 45 C.F.R. § 86.11 provides that the regulations apply “to every recipient and to each education program or activity operated by such recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.” A recipient is defined as:

There is no dispute that the Oregon penal system does receive federal funds.

Certain institutions are specifically exempted from coverage by the regulations: religious schools, military and merchant marine educational institutions, sororities and fraternities, YMCA, YWCA, Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and other voluntary youth service organizations. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.12-86.14 . There is no exemption for correctional institutions.

The court concurs with the district court that state prisons receiving federal funds must comply with the regulations applicable to Title IX, 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1 et seq. But the application of those regulations must be consistent with the basic needs of prisons and the bona fide reasons for segregation of the genders in prisons.

V.

Plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in requiring only “parity,” rather than “equality,” of treatment under Title IX in the context of prison educational programs. Defendants contend that Title IX requires only the level of protection offered by the Equal Protection Clause, and that “parity” is therefore sufficient to satisfy Title IX.

We again focus on the language of the statute. Title IX provides that “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...” 20 U.S.C. § 1681 . The statute’s language clearly states that women may not be excluded from participation in educational programs, may not be denied the benefits of educational programs, and may not be subjected to discrimination in the covered educational programs. This language suggests that the standard is “equality” rather than “parity.”

One case discussing Title IX’s applicability to prisons held that women were entitled to more protection under Title IX than under the Equal Protection Clause. That court said that Title IX required the state to “offer equivalent programs in form as well as in substance.” Canterino, 546 F.Supp. at 210 . The court stated that not all programs need *1227 to be co-correctional, but that “a consistent good faith effort must be made to include female inmates in the benefits of all programs ...” Id. In contrast, the court said that under the Equal Protection Clause, opportunities available to women must be substantially equivalent in substance, if not in form, to those available to men, and that the constitution only required “parity.” Id., citing Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D.Mich.1979) (applying intermediate scrutiny standard of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451, 456 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), to Equal Protection challenge of sex discrimination in prisons).

Defendants base their argument that Title IX is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause by interpreting Title IX with cases analyzing Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. They contend that Title VI is coextensive with the constitution, and does not mandate more than what is required under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 340 , 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2773 , 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress intended the meaning of [Title Vi’s] prohibition to evolve with the interpretation of the commands of the Constitution”). Title VI uses almost the same language as Title IX, providing that, “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

Defendants are correct that Title IX is sometimes analyzed according to principles defined in Title VI cases. However, those decisions have been largely procedural rather than substantive. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 684-89 , 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1951-53 , 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (analyzing whether a private right of action exists under Title IX and Title VI); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 , 104 S.Ct. 1211, 1218 , 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984) (analyzing whether student aid funds constitute federal financial assistance sufficient to trigger Title ■ IX and Title VI); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-37 , 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (analyzing whether damages remedy is available in a private action brought to enforce Title VI and IX). And the decisions finding Title VI to be coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause were based largely on the legislative history of Title VI (passed in 1964), which is not necessarily analogous to the legislative history of Title IX (passed in 1972). See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 338 , 98 S.Ct. at 2772 ; Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 589-91 , 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3225-27 , 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983).

Under the Equal Protection Clause gender and race are treated differently; race is accorded strict scrutiny whereas gender is only accorded intermediate scrutiny. 4 By contrast, the language of both Title VI and Title IX is the same: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex [race for Title VI], be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination ...”

Because Title IX and Title VI use the same language, they should, as a matter of statutory interpretation, be read to require the same levels of protection and equality. They should not be read to require different levels of protection because the Equal Protection Clause is interpreted differently for *1228 race than for gender. Research has disclosed no opinion holding that Title IX is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause. In the absence of such authority, it is not proper to depart from the plain language of the statute. Thus, like the court in Canterino, we hold that prison educational programs subject to Title IX must be “equally” available to male and female inmates. We therefore REVERSE the district court’s ruling that only “parity” rather than “equality” is required in prison education programs subject to Title IX.

But what does “equality” mean in a prison setting?

VI.

Prisons are different from other institutions to which Title IX applies. Security is an important concern. And sex segregation is the accepted norm. In Oregon there are far more male than female prisoners; each of three men’s prisons holds more inmates than does the single women’s prison. It is thus important to consider what Title IX and its regulations require of such state prison educational programs.

Does equality mean that women must have access to exactly the same programs offered to men, either within the women’s prison or by transporting the women to the men’s prisons? If women are transported to men’s prisons, does the imposition of additional burdens, such as tardiness and “skin searches,” violate Title IX? May the fact that men’s prisons are larger and contain more inmates be taken into account when deciding how many and what classes to offer?

The regulations under Title IX are the first step in defining the applicable standards. They state generally that “no person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or other education program or activity operated by a recipient ...” 45 C.F.R. § 86.31 (a). Specifically, recipients are prohibited from (1) treating the genders differently in determining eligibility for programs; (2) providing “different aid, benefits, or services or provid[ing] aid, benefits, or services in a different manner”; (3) denying anyone “aid, benefits or services”; (4) subjecting anyone “to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions or other treatment.” 45 C.F.R. § 86.31 (b). Strictly construing the regulations would suggest that women should have identical access to the same classes, vocational programs, and apprenticeships as men.

However, the regulations do not deal with the fact that prisons have special security concerns that other educational institutions do not, and that the genders are segregated for security reasons. Nor do the regulations consider that: women’s prisons are usually smaller than each of the men’s prisons; there may not be the same demands for the same courses; and some programs are site-specific, such as those near a local community college which may offer different programs.

Some regulations under Title IX pertain to programs which may be offered separately on the basis of sex. For example, the regulations provide that institutions may administer scholarships provided by foreign institutions or wills that are restricted by sex, as long as they make “available reasonable opportunities for similar studies for members of the other sex.” 45 C.F.R. § 86.31 (c). And educational institutions are not required to have exactly equal athletic teams, or to spend the same amount of money on teams for both sexes, but they are required to provide “equal opportunities." 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (c).

We think that it is clear that Title IX and its regulations do not require gender-integrated classes in prisons. Institutions may have separate toilet, shower and locker room facilities. And institutions may “provide separate housing on the basis of sex.” 45 C.F.R. § 86.32 (c). That section defines the standards for the separate housing:

The district court will face the difficult task of determining how those requirements, as well as the permissible extent of the security concerns, are to be applied to Oregon’s farm annex and forest work crews.

If an education program takes place in the prison, exclusion of women from a particular class solely because women do not reside at the prison offering that class is not improperly segregating “separately on .the basis of sex,” but -it is rather an activity “separately on the basis of location.” The prohibited activity would be the offering of educational programs only in the men’s prisons, without offering equivalent programs in the women’s prison. In that case, women would be “denied the benefits of a program” on account of sex.

Strict one-for-one identity of classes may not be required by the regulations. But there must be reasonable opportunities for similar studies at the women’s prison and women must have an equal opportunity to participate in educational programs. For example, the apprenticeship programs offered to men and women could perhaps differ depending on interest and need, but totally denying women access to half the apprenticeship opportunities men have would seem to violate the regulations. In this case, women were denied access to all of the mechanical trade apprenticeships. And facilities such as labs, classrooms, and workshops must be comparable to each other.

It may not be necessary to offer as many classes in a small women’s prison as in the larger men’s prisons. But the number of classes offered should at least be proportionate, not just to the total number of inmates, but to the number of inmates desiring to take educational programs. And the inmates must be made aware of the opportunity for participation in various programs before their interests can be assessed. In order to give women “equal opportunity,” there may need to be a higher number of courses offered so that women have comparable variety in course selection.

Neither this appellate court, nor perhaps even a state or federal district court, can define the precise type and number of educational and work programs to be offered to the genders in prisons. The role of the judicial branch is not to take over those important and difficult functions of the executive branch. Rather, the judicial branch can only define the boundaries of what is required of the executive branch by Congress and by the constitution. It is clear to this court that state prisons receiving federal funds are required by Title IX to make reasonable efforts to offer the same educational opportunities to women as to men. Although the programs need not be identical in number or content, women must have reasonable opportunities for similar studies and must have an equal opportunity to participate in programs of comparable quality. These are the standards which the district court must attempt to apply on the remand of the issue of equality under Title IX. We do not minimize the difficulties of applying these standards or the problems discussed by the dissent.

VII.

Plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s holding that “in the context of a prison, a correctional division policy which results in a gender based disparate impact ... can be justified by a ‘penological necessity’ ” under Title IX. The district court held that this affirmative defense of penological necessity justified many of the disparities in Oregon’s prison educational programs. The court’s definition of “penological necessity” was not limited to security concerns, but also included the goals of “efficient and cost effective rehabilitation.”

The district court quite logically interpreted the penological necessity defense by analogy to the “business necessity defense” under Title VII disparate impact eases, and the “educational necessity defense” under Title VT and Title IX disparate impact cases. Under those titles, once plaintiffs have shown that a facially neutral practice has a disparate impact, the defendant may still prevail by proving a business or educational necessity for the practice. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke *1230 Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 , 91 S.Ct. 849, 854 , 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (Title VII); Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir.1984) (no educational justification under Title VI for administering I.Q. tests which disproportionately place minorities in classes for retarded children); Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Ed. Dept., 709 F.Supp. 345, 360-364 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (no educational justification under Title IX for awarding merit scholarships based solely on SAT scores, which disproportionately affects girls adversely).

However, this court concludes that peno-logical necessity is not a defense to Title IX. Rather, it is just one concern to be considered in how the equality principles of Title IX are to be applied in prisons. Our holding that Title IX does not require co-educational classes in prisons satisfies most of the legitimate security concerns. And we disagree with the district court that efficiency and cost effectiveness are valid security concerns. They are cost and management concerns which must be applied consistently with the requirements of Title IX. We agree with the Canterino court that the requirements of Title IX can be carried out “without compromising any valid correctional concerns over security, order, and discipline.” Canterino, 546 F.Supp. at 210 . As we have discussed, Title IX and its regulations contain numerous exceptions, but do not exempt prisons.

In the context of prison employment, the United States Supreme Court considered the business necessity defense to a charge that height and weight requirements had a disparate impact on women who wished to be prison guards, and the Court found that such requirements improperly excluded women ■without a valid business necessity. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 , 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2726-28 , 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). It did not apply a more deferential standard than the normal Title VII analysis merely because the employer was a prison. Id.

In interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court also made it clear that the business necessity defense is not available in disparate treatment cases, but only in disparate impact cases. In disparate treatment cases employers must pass the more stringent test of bona fide occupational qualification which is mandated by statute. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 , 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1204 , 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2)-2(e)(l). Title IX contains no explicit statutory exemption such as that test. We need not resolve here whether the proper analysis for all of the educational programs in this case is disparate treatment or disparate impact. We need only restate our conclusion that peno-logical necessity is not a defense in a Title IX case, but only a factor in how Title IX is applied in prisons.

The district court’s application of penological necessity to plaintiffs’ Title IX claims must therefore be REMANDED for reconsideration under these standards.

VIII.

Defendants appeal the district court’s decision on vocational training pay, which also formed the basis for an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs on their claim that paying men, but not women,- for vocational training violated Title IX. Defendants contend that the district court erred in holding that that disparate effect created liability under the regulations to Title IX without the necessity of showing an intent by defendants to discriminate.

At trial, the district court found that two of the men’s prisons (OSP and OSCI) offer 12 vocational courses each; the women’s prison (OWCC) offers only 2 courses. However, women were free to participate in all vocational programs at OSCI. Men at OSCI were eligible for “merit pay” for their participation in vocational programs, but women in the same vocational programs at OSCI were not paid. 5 The court ruled that “plaintiffs did not prove intent to discriminate on the basis of gender,” apparently because the decision not to pay women was not made with a malevolent motive but because OWCC and OSP had a historical policy of not paying *1231 inmates for education. The court therefore held that paying men but not women violated Title IX, where no intent was required, but not the Equal Protection Clause.

The court assumed that not paying women for participating in vocational classes at OSCI, while paying men performing the same jobs in the same place, was a discriminatory effect rather than disparate treatment of men and women. However, the absence of discriminatory motive does not transform a policy which discriminates on its face into a neutral policy with only a discriminatory effect. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198-201 , 111 S.Ct. at 1208-04 . Under defendants’ system, men at OSCI received merit pay for vocational training, whereas no women taking the same training at OSCI received pay. Men and women worked side by side in the same programs, but only the men and not the women were paid for their work. This constitutes disparate treatment, not merely disparate impact. There is thus no need to decide whether disparate impact claims under Title IX’s regulations require proof of discriminatory intent.

We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling. The award of merit pay to men, but not to women, participating in the same vocational training course in the same location constitutes disparate treatment, not disparate impact. Such disparate treatment is clearly forbidden by Title IX and its regulations. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.31 , 86.51. Because we affirm that finding, we also affirm the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs. ■

IX.

One claim of plaintiffs’ on appeal has not been discussed. Plaintiffs argue that the district court’s ruling on their Equal Protection claim was error. The district court held that under the Equal Protection Clause discriminatory policies could be upheld if they were “reasonably related to legitimate peno-logical interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 , 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261 , 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Plaintiffs argue that in this case the proper standard of review is whether the discriminatory classification is substantially related to an important governmental interest. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 , 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982); Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1454 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Turner reasonableness standard not applicable to prison policy decisions that do not implicate prison security and day-to-day management concerns).

Because our decisions above with respect to the application of Title IX will resolve the issues in this case, it is unnecessary to reach this constitutional question. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 , 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1384 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive noneonstitutional ground is available.”).

X.

The dissent suggests that we should affirm the district court because appellants have not challenged specific findings of fact made by that court. However, when a district court’s findings are based upon an incorrect legal standard, the appropriate remedy is to remand so that findings can be made in accordance with the applicable legal standard. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 291-92 , 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 1791-92 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir.1989).

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings using the standards defined in this opinion. On remand, the district court’s application of these standards may result in some of the same ultimate conclusions as it has already reached in its extensive Pretrial Order, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. However, because the standards used by the district court were in some respects different from those that we now define, reconsideration on remand is necessary.

. "Skin searches" are required of all prisoners, male and female, when moving between prisons.

. Failure to participate in apprenticeship programs does not preclude women from legal standing to protest their exclusion if they were not informed of the opportunity to so participate. See e.g., Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir.1973) (holding that failure to notify minorities of opportunities for transfers and promotions constituted discrimination).

. In 1971, Senator Bayh introduced legislation which was the predecessor to Title IX, but which was not passed. When debating that predecessor bill, Senator Bayh stated:

117 Cong.Rec. 30403 (1971). This comment implies that Senator Bayh did not intend the predecessor bill to apply to penitentiaries. However, neither Senator Bayh nor any of the other congressman made any comments regarding the application of Title IX to penal institutions during the debates about the final version of the amendments which became Title IX.

Senator Bayh introduced the amendment in 1972. Title IX is more extensive than the predecessor bill which Senator Bayh discussed in the quote above. The predecessor legislation would only have guaranteed equal educational opportunity in "program[s] and activities] conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any school or department of graduate education which is a recipient of federal financial assistance.” 117 Cong.Record 30399, sec. 601. 118 Cong.Record 4964. The Senate bill, which was accepted by the conference committee, prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender "under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” with certain enumerated exceptions. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 .

. Statutes that discriminate on the basis of gender are upheld only if the government can show that the classification "serve[s] important governmental objectives” and that the discriminatory means employed are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” See e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 , 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 , 100 S.Ct. 1540, 1545 , 64 L.Ed.2d 107 (1980); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197 , 97 S.Ct. at 456 . Statutes that discriminate on the basis of racial or ethnic classification are upheld only if the government can show a "compelling governmental interest” and that the means chosen to effectuate its purpose are "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal”, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 274 , 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1847 , 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 , 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82 , 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984).

. Men at OSP were not paid for vocational training. Historically, OWCC was associated with OSP. And the policy at OSP and OWCC was that inmates are not paid for education.