Opinion by Judge DAVID R. THOMPSON; Dissent by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge NOONAN.

In 1978, an Arizona jury convicted Jimmie Wayne Jeffers of first degree murder. 1 After a sentencing hearing, the trial court found two aggravating factors and.no mitigating circumstances. The court sentenced Jeffers to death, in accordance with the Arizona death penalty statute, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13=154 (Supp.1973) (currently Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 13-703 (1989)).

The Arizona Supreme Court vacated Jef-fers’s death sentence and remanded his case to the trial court for resentencing in light of that court’s decision in State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441 , 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 , 99 S.Ct. 1254 , 59 L.Ed.2d 478 (1979). In Watson , the Arizona Supreme Court applied the principles of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), which held a sentencer in a capital proceeding cannot be restricted to the *414 specific mitigating factors enumerated in a death penalty statute, but must consider any aspect of a defendant’s background or character the defendant offers as a justification for not imposing the death penalty.

On June 20 and July 10, 1980, the trial court held supplemental sentencing hearings. Again it found two aggravating factors: Jef-fers created a grave risk of death to a third person in the commission of the murder, and Jeffers committed the murder in an especially heinous, cruel, and depraved manner. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 13-703(F)(3) and (6) (1989). The trial court found no mitigating circumstances and resentenced Jeffers to death.

On review, the Arizona Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to prove Jef-fers knowingly created a grave risk of death to a third person while committing the murder, and invalidated this aggravating factor. State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 428-29 , 661 P.2d 1105, 1129-30 , cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 , 78 L.Ed.2d 174 (1983). The Arizona Supreme Court also found the state failed to prove Jeffers committed the murder in an especially “cruel” manner, but determined that “the events surrounding the murder itself support the trial court’s finding that the murder was ‘especially heinous .... and depraved.’ ” Id. at 430, 661 P.2d at 1131 . The court affirmed Jeffers’s death sentence, stat 1 ing, “In our independent determination we found one aggravating factor — that the offense was committed in an especially heinous and depraved manner — and no mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Id. at 432 , 661 P.2d at 1133 .

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Jeffers’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Jeffers v. Ricketts, 627 F.Supp. 1334 (D.Ariz.1986). On appeal, a panel of this court granted the writ of habeas corpus and vacated Jeffers’s death sentence. The panel.held that although the “especially heinous ... or depraved” aggravating factors listed in section 13-703(F)(6) of the Arizona Revised Statutes were constitutional as construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, those factors had not been constitutionally applied in Jeffers’s case. Jeffers v. Ricketts, 832 F.2d 476, 482-86 (9th Cir.1987).

The Supreme Court reversed, stating it had rejected an identical claim in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652-55 , 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3056-58 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 777 , 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3100-01 , 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990). It remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 784 , 110 S.Ct. at 3104.

Following remand, the panel again ordered the writ issued and vacated Jeffers’s death sentence. This time the panel held the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court was not sufficiently clear to permit the panel to determine whether, consistent with Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 , 110 S.Ct. 1441 , 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), the Arizona Supreme Court had reweighed all of the mitigating circumstances against the remaining aggravating factor. Jeffers v. Lewis, 5 F.3d 1199, 1206-09 (9th Cir.1992).

We granted en banc review. We now affirm the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus.

DISCUSSION

Under Clemons, 494 U.S. at 741 , 110 S.Ct. at 1444, in a “weighing” state such as Arizona, when a trial court bases its decision to impose a death sentence on both valid and invalid aggravating factors, a state appellate court can affirm the sentence only after performing a harmless-error review, or reweighing the mitigating evidence against the remaining valid aggravating factors. See Richmond v. Lewis, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 528, 535 , 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992); Sochor v. Florida, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992); Stringer v. Black, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). The Supreme Court has never specified the degree of clarity with which a state appellate court must reweigh in order to cure an otherwise invalid death sentence. See Richmond, — U.S. at—, 113 S.Ct. at 535 .

Close state appellate court scrutiny is required, Stringer , — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1136, but the Court has not said what must appear in the state appellate court’s opinion for us to conclude it has satisfied Clemons’s reweighing requirements. *415 Justice O’Connor has said, in applying Clemons’s standard for harmless error review, that “[a]n appellate court’s bald assertion” of harmless error without “a principled explanation of how the court reached that conclusion” is not sufficient. See Sochor, — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 2123 (O’Connor, J., concurring). On the other hand, the Court has said that a statement by the sentencing court that it considered all mitigating evidence is adequate, Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 314-15 , 111 S.Ct. 731, 736-37 , 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991), and in this circuit we presume state courts follow the law, even when they fail to so indicate. Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1631 , 128 L.Ed.2d 354 (1994).

Here, the Arizona Supreme Court not only said it independently reweighed the remaining aggravating factor against the mitigating circumstances, it provided a principled explanation of what it did. It began by acknowledging its obligation under section 13-703(E) of the Arizona Revised Statutes to undertake an independent review of the record to consider the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and “determine for ourselves if the latter outweigh the former when we find both to be present.” Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 428 , 661 P.2d at 1129 . It then analyzed the evidence before the trial court to evaluate the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It invalidated one of the aggravating factors found by the trial court, and modified another. Id. at 428-30 , 661 P.2d at 1129-31 . Cf. Stringer, — U.S. at—, 112 S.Ct. at 1136-37.

The court next assessed Jeffers’s mitigation evidence. It examined his arguments and the testimony regarding his long-term use of heroin, his use of alcohol and heroin on the date of the murder, his assertion of provocation for the murder, and the statements he made to psychiatrists while under the influence of sodium amytal. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 430-31 , 661 P.2d at 1131-32 . Agreeing with the trial court’s findings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded there was no substantial evidence supporting mitigation. Id. at 431 , 661 P.2d at 1132 . The court then stated, “We have carefully reviewed the record as required to determine whether the factors in mitigation outweigh the aggravating circumstances, State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186 , 560 P.2d 41 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 , 97 S.Ct. 2988 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977), and we find they do not.” Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 431-32 , 661 P.2d at 1132-33 .

Even though the Arizona Supreme Court cited Richmond, it is clear the court’s independent review of the record and'its explanation of its reweighing process satisfied the requirements of Clemons and Stringer. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 750-52 , 110 S.Ct. at 1449-56 ; Stringer , — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 1136.

Jeffers, however, argues the Arizona Supreme Court should not have engaged in any reweighing once it invalidated an aggravating factor. He contends the case should have been remanded to the trial court to reweigh the remaining aggravating factors against the mitigating circumstances. He contends this failure to remand to the trial court violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree.

“Following Clemons , a reviewing court is not compelled to remand” for resentencing when it invalidates an aggravating factor, so long as it reweighs the evidence independently. Parker, 498 U.S. at 320 , 111 S.Ct. at 739 . See also Walton, 497 U.S. at 647 , 110 S.Ct. at 3053 . Because the Arizona Supreme Court reweighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it was not required to remand the case under federal law.

State law, however, that guarantees a criminal defendant procedural rights at sentencing, may give rise to a state-created liberty interest protected from arbitrary deprivation by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 , 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229 , 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980). See also Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746—47, 110 S.Ct. at 1447-48. Jeffers argues the Arizona Supreme Court has created such a liberty interest by uniformly remanding death penalty cases to the trial court after invalidating an aggravating factor. We reject this argument.

In Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746 ^7, 110 S.Ct. at 1447-48 , the Supreme Court considered a *416 similar claim. The Mississippi Supreme Court had invalidated an aggravating factor, and refused to remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Clemons argued that pursuant to section 99-19-101 of the Mississippi Code, only a jury had the authority to impose a death sentence. The Court, however, held that because in Clemons’s case, and other cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court had asserted its authority under state law to decide independently whether a death sentence should be affirmed, Clemons had no “unqualified” liberty interest in having a jury reweigh his aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. at 747 , 110 S.Ct. at 1447 — 18.

Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has not developed a uniform policy of remanding after invalidating an aggravating factor. See Karen L. Hinse, Note, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: An Analysis of the Impact of Clemons v. Mississippi in Arizona, 34 Ariz.L.Rev. 141, 156-60 (1992). In some cases, the Arizona Supreme Court simply has upheld the death sentence. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 607 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1210 (1993) (after invalidating an aggravating factor, “our response has been more consistent in theory than in practice”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1578 , 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994); State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491 , 707 P.2d 289 (1985); State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388 , 698 P.2d 183 (1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct. 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986); State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564 , 691 P.2d 655 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 , 105 S.Ct. 1775 , 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985). In others it has remanded for resentencing. See, e.g., State v. Hinchey, 165 Ariz. 432, 440 , 799 P.2d 352, 360 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 963 , 111 S.Ct. 1589 , 113 L.Ed.2d 653 (1991). See also Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1038 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Adamson, 497 U.S. 1031 , 110 S.Ct. 3287 , 111 L.Ed.2d 795 (1990).

An example of the Arizona Supreme Court declining to remand for resentencing is Bible, 175 Ariz. at 607 , 858 P.2d at 1210 . There, the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated one of three aggravating factors found by the trial court. It then assessed the defendant’s evidence in mitigation, and stated:

Bible, 175 Ariz. at 606 , 858 P.2d at 1209 . Because the Arizona Supreme Court found that Bible’s evidence in mitigation was of no more than “de minimis weight,” it did not remand but simply upheld his death sentence. Id. at 609 , 858 P.2d at 1212 .

It is apparent from the decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court there is no unqualified right to a remand to the trial court for resentencing when an aggravating factor is invalidated. There is, therefore, no constitutionally recognized state liberty interest in such a procedure. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 747 , 110 S.Ct. at 1447-48 . See also United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 252 , 106 S.Ct. 610, 616 , 88 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 , 101 S.Ct. 2460 , 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (9th Cir.1988); De Silva v. Smith, 175 F.2d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir.1985).

Jeffers argues the reweighing process was flawed in any event because the trial court as well as the Arizona Supreme Court failed to consider all of his mitigating evidence, in violation of Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 , 98 S.Ct. at 2964 , and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 , 102 S.Ct. 869, 876-77 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).

In a capital case, the “senteneer [may] ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant *417 proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 , 102 S.Ct. at 874 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 , 98 S.Ct. at 2964 ). See also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377-78 , 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1196-97 , 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374-75 , 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1865-66 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1670-71 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). Similarly, “the sen-tencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114 , 102 S.Ct. at 877 ).

Both at trial and at the sentencing hearings, Jeffers offered evidence in mitigation. However, when the trial court first sentenced him to death in 1978, it refused to consider mitigation evidence that did not rise to the level of enumerated statutory mitigating factors. In an unpublished decision, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated Jeffers’s death sentence and remanded the ease to the trial court with instructions to consider all statutory and non-statutory mitigating evidence and weigh that evidence against any aggravating factors.

Pursuant to that remand, the trial court held two supplemental sentencing hearings. After these hearings the court found:

The trial court also specifically discussed Jeffers’s addiction to drugs and alcohol, his use of drugs and alcohol on the date of the murder (but the lack of credible evidence his capacity was significantly impaired), his age, and the fact that there was no evidence of duress. The court found that while there was some evidence of provocation, stress, and a motive for the killing, such evidence was insufficient to establish mitigating circumstances.

The Arizona Supreme Court also discussed this evidence, and found it insubstantial. See Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 430-31 , 661 P.2d at 1131-32 . It also found, after its independent review of the record, that the trial court had examined all the evidence presented in mitigation at the trial and post-trial hearings. Id., 135 Ariz. at 431 , 661 P.2d at 1132 . The record confirms this.

Jeffers argues the trial court’s failure to list and discuss each item of evidence he offered in mitigation demonstrates the trial court neglected to consider all of his mitigation evidence. To support this argument he relies on Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir.1990), in which we stated that a court must make explicit findings on all relevant mitigating circumstances, “including those it finds insufficient to warrant leniency.” Jeffers’s reliance on Smith is misplaced.

In Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1196 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1294 , 127 L.Ed.2d 647 (1994), we found the quoted language in Smith was dictated by the Smith court’s interpretation of a “specific state statute requiring the court to make written findings as to the weight of the mitigating evidence.”

Here, it is unclear whether Arizona law required the trial court to make specific findings on all items of evidence offered in mitigation. But see Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851 , 858 n. 5 (9th Cir.1991) (Arizona has no listing requirement), cert, denied sub nom. Clark v. Lewis, — U.S.—, 113 S.Ct. 117 , 121 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). On the other hand, in State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 516 , 633 P.2d 315, 325 (1981), the Arizona Supreme Court said section 13-703 of the Arizona Revised Statutes does not require a trial court to make such detailed findings, so long as the court heard and considered all of the evidence presented by the defendant. On the *418 other hand, State v. Leslie, 147 Ariz. 38, 50 , 708 P.2d 719, 731 (1985), and State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. at 196 , 560 P.2d at 51 , seem to reach the opposite conclusion.

We do not find a clear requirement under Arizona law that the sentencer must itemize and discuss every piece of evidence offered in mitigation. Smith is inapposite. Although such a listing procedure would be helpful to clarify that the trial court considered all mitigation evidence, this is not necessary in the present case. Here, it is clear the trial court considered all evidence Jeffers offered in mitigation.

Nor was Jeffers entitled to a specific listing and discussion of each piece of mitigating evidence under federal constitutional law. While “it is important that the record on appeal disclose to the reviewing court the considerations which motivated the death sentence,” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1206 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion), “due process does not require that the sentencer exhaustively document its analysis of each mitigating factor as long as a reviewing federal court can discern from the record that the state court did indeed consider all mitigating evidence offered by the defendant.” Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1197 . See also Parker, 498 U.S. at 313-18 , 111 S.Ct. at 735-38 ; Clemons, 494 U.S. at 750 , 110 S.Ct. at 1449 ; Clark, 958 F.2d at 858 . As discussed above, because it is evident the trial court considered all mitigating evidence offered by Jeffers, there was no due process violation. 2

Jeffers also argues the Arizona sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to require the state to prove death is the appropriate sentence. This argument lacks merit. In Walton, 497 U.S. at 651-52 , 110 S.Ct. at 3056-57 , the Court held Arizona constitutionally can mandate the imposition of the death penalty when a sentencer finds the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 , 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1082-83 , 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990); Boyde, 494 U.S. at 377 . The Court also held section 13-703(E) of the Arizona Revised Statutes does not automatically require the imposition of the death penalty, or fail to allow for an individualized sentence determination. Walton, 497 U.S. at 652 , 110 S.Ct. at 3056-57 .

Jeffers next argues he was impermis-sibly penalized with the death penalty for exercising his right to a jury trial after he rejected the state’s offers of a less harsh sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. He contends the state’s last offer would have allowed him to plead guilty to second degree murder and receive a sentence not to exceed twenty years in prison. This argument is meritless.

A trial court is not restricted in its sentencing to the terms of a rejected plea offer, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64 , 98 S.Ct. 663, 667-68 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Nor does “the prosecutorial practice of threatening a defendant with increased charges if he does not plead guilty, and following through on that threat if the defendant insists on his right to stand trial,” Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2206 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), create a presumption of vindictive prosecution. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378-81 , 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2492-93 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 221-23 , 99 S.Ct. 492, 498-99 , 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978); United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275, 1280-81 (9th Cir.1984). In Borden-kircher, the defendant voluntarily rejected a pretrial plea offer that would have required a five-year prison sentence. The trial court *419 sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment following his conviction. The Court held because the defendant properly was chargeable under the applicable law, and voluntarily chose to reject the plea offer, there was no constitutional violation. Id. at 358-59, 98 S.Ct. at 665-66. See also Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 221-23 , 99 S.Ct. at 499-500 .

Jeffers does not contend his rejection of the plea offers was not voluntary, or that he was not chargeable with the death penalty. The district court found he was aware of the risk he was taking in refusing the plea offers, Jeffers, 627 F.Supp. at 1361 . Jeffers does not dispute this finding.

Jeffers next argues Arizona’s death penalty statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because section 13-703(B) of the Arizona Revised Statutes requires the trial judge to determine the factual existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a capital ease, whereas section 13-604(K) of the Arizona Revised Statutes and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 19.1(b) entitle non-capital defendants to jury hearings for sentence enhancements. See State v. Sherrill, 168 Ariz. 469 , 472 & n. 2, 815 P.2d 396 , 399 & n. 2 (1991). See also Myers v. Ylst, 897 F.2d 417 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 , 111 S.Ct. 212 , 112 L.Ed.2d 172 (1990).

We reject this argument. It is the same argument we confronted and rejected in Clark, 958 F.2d at 859 . There, relying on Walton, 497 U.S. at 647 , 110 S.Ct. at 3053-54 , we held, “The Constitution does not require that a jury find the aggravating circumstances supporting a death sentence,” and merely invoking the equal protection clause does not alter this result. Clark, 958 F.2d at 859 .

Death penalty sentences are “qualitatively different” from prison sentences. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991-92 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 , 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2967 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (plurality opinion), the Court stated, “[J]udicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.” The decision of the Arizona legislature to vest in the trial judge the responsibility to find aggravating and mitigating circumstances is rational. This process does not render the statute unconstitutional.

Jeffers contends Arizona’s imposition of the death penalty violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment, because Arizona imposes the death penalty discriminatorily on impoverished males convicted of killing Caucasians. This argument lacks merit.

In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 , 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1767 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a defendant alleging discrimination must prove “the deci-sionmaker[ ] in his case acted with a discriminatory purpose.” See also Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 113 S.Ct. 1600 , 123 L.Ed.2d 163 (1993); Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1373-74 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051, 110 S.Ct. 854 , 107 L.Ed.2d 848 (1990).

Jeffers is a Caucasian male. His victim was a Caucasian female. He offers no evidence supporting an inference that his economic status or the race or gender of his victim played a part in his sentence, or that such factors create a constitutionally significant risk of impermissible bias in the Arizona capital sentencing process. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 , 107 S.Ct. at 1767 ; Carriger, 971 F.2d at 334 ; Harris, 885 F.2d at 1373-74 .

CONCLUSION

The district court’s denial of Jeffers’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.

. The facts of this case are set forth in greater detail in Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 766-73 , 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3094-98 , 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990).

. Jeffers asserts the trial court failed to evaluate as a mitigating circumstance the fact that on several occasions the state offered him less harsh sentences in exchange for a guilty plea. Because Jeffers failed to argue before the state courts that the state's plea offers constituted mitigating circumstances, if the trial court or the Arizona Supreme Court failed to consider this evidence in sentencing, the neglect is attributable to Jef-fers. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). There is no constitutional violation by a sentencer failing to consider mitigating circumstances when a defendant neglects to argue such circumstances exist. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 , 306 n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1078 , 1083 n. 4, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990). See also Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. at 877 n. 10 ("Lockett requires the sentencer to listen.”).