William B. Melugin v. Lloyd F. Hames, Commissioner

Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge CANBY.

OVERVIEW

William B. Melugin, an Alaska state prisoner, appeals the District Court’s denial of his habeas petition. Melugin challenges his conviction for interference with official proceedings on the grounds that the Alaska statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 . We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In the mid-1980’s, William B. Melugin, a resident of Cordova, Alaska, became involved in a dispute with the Cordova Telephone Cooperative (the “Co-op”) over loss of telephone services provided by the Co-op to Melugin’s small trucking business. Melugin claims that, as a result, he lost his business. Efforts to settle the dispute failed.

In April of 1987, Melugin filed a civil complaint in Alaska superior court against the Co-op. Shortly after the Co-op filed its answer, Melugin came to the courthouse in Cordova and spoke with state Magistrate Susan Weltz and demanded that his case be set for trial immediately. Magistrate Weltz told Melugin that setting a trial date was not a simple matter and explained that trial *1481…

dissenting:

I agree with the majority that the statute under which Melugin was convicted was not unconstitutionally vague, and that it was intended to apply to the type of conduct engaged in by Melugin. I also agree that a jury could properly find that Melugin’s communication was a “true threat.” Where I differ respectfully from the majority is in the matter of facial overbreadth. In my view, AS § 11.56.510(a)(1), when read in the light of its incorporated definitions in §§ 11.81.900(b)(55) and 11.41.520, is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the statute was sufficiently narrowed by the Alaska Court of Appeals.

Our key precedent regarding facial over-breadth is Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir.1983). Wurtz involved a threat of rape. The governing statute made it a felony to communicate, with the purpose of causing another to perform or omit an act, a threat to perform any of a listed number of acts including a threat to “commit any criminal offense.” Wurtz, 719 F.2d at 1439 (quoting Mont.Code Ann. § 45-5-203(l)(c) (1981)). We held that the latter phrase rendered the statute fatally overbroad on its face, because it…

38 F.3d 1478 William B. MELUGIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lloyd F. HAMES, Commissioner, Defendant-Appellee. No. 93-36109. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Aug. 5, 1994. Decided Oct. 25, 1994. Nancy J. Shaw, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Anchorage, AK, for plaintiff-appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Sp. Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, AK, for defendant-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. Before: PREGERSON, CANBY, and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge CANBY. PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: OVERVIEW 1 William B. Melugin, an Alaska state prisoner, appeals the District Court's denial of his habeas petition. Melugin challenges his conviction for interference with official proceedings on the grounds that the Alaska statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253 . We affirm. BACKGROUND 2 In the mid-1980's, William B. Melugin, a resident of Cordova, Alaska, became involved in a dispute with the Cordova Telephone Cooperative (the…