Opinion by Chief Judge Wallace; Dissent by Judge Reinhardt.

Yasser Abdulrahim Shooshtary seeks review of the judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying his application for relief from deportation based on extreme hardship. The Board had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1 (B)(2), 242.21 (1992). We have jurisdiction over this timely application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We deny the petition.

I

Shooshtary is a native of Iran and citizen of Great Britain. He lived in Great Britain, where his children attended grade school, until he came to the United States. His wife and 14-year-old twin children are legal permanent residents, but he is not. In June 1985, Shooshtary was convicted, upon a plea of guilty in federal district court, of conspiracy to defraud the government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 . After learning of the conviction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) sought to deport Shooshtary to Great Britain based upon the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 , which makes deportable any alien who “is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of entry” and who is “[sentenced or confined] for a year or more.” ‘ 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(4) (1988) (amended 1990).

Because he is married to a lawful permanent resident, Shooshtary requested that the attorney general change his status as an alien to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (a), thereby preventing deportation under section 1251(a)(4). Such a request can only be granted if, among other things, Shooshtary would be eligible to receive an immigrant visa and be admissible to the United States for permanent residence, as required by section 1255(a)(2). Because of Shooshtary’s conviction, he was ineligible and so he requested a waiver of the section 1255(a)(2) requirement on the ground of extreme hardship to his permanent resident spouse and children, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (h)(1)(B). The immigration judge and the Board denied the waiver, holding that Shooshtary failed to provide sufficient evidence showing extreme hardship to his family should he be deported to Great Britain. The effect of the Board’s decision is that Shooshtary is not eligible to have his status changed to that of lawful permanent resident, and can therefore be deported.

II

The determination by the Board that Shooshtary did not produce enough evi *1051 dence to make out a claim of extreme hardship under section 1182(h)(1)(B) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 467 (9th Cir.1991) (Hassan). The Board must “ ‘state its reasons’ ” for denying relief, id., quoting Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir.1985), and base its decision on “all relevant factors.” Id. at 468. However, the applicant has the burden of proving extreme hardship. While the Board must consider all of the facts presented, any facts not brought to its attention cannot, obviously, be considered. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1493 (9th Cir.1986) (“If the alien presents insufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof ... then there would be substantial evidence in the record to support a decision [that the alien is ineligible] even if the INS produces no evidence.”).

We agree with the Board’s statement in this case that a section 1182(h)(1)(B) “waiver should be granted only in those cases where ‘great actual or prospective injury’ to the qualifying party will occur. There must be an ‘extreme impact’ on the citizen or lawful permanent resident family member. ...” Citing Matter of Ngai, 19 I & N Dec. 245 (BIA 1984). We hold that the Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Shooshtary failed to meet this burden as to his wife and children.

The Board held that Shooshtary testified in nonspecific terms, alleging that his wife cannot support the family should he be deported, that he would be unable to find employment in Great Britain at his age and with his qualifications, and that his children would be traumatized if separated from him. As the Board pointed out, he offered no evidence regarding his wife’s income, no evidence why his family could not join him in Great Britain, no evidence why he believes that he could not gain employment in Great Britain, no evidence of his wife’s inability to gain employment in Great Britain, and no evidence that his case was treated differently because of his Iranian descent.

In short, no evidence was presented by Shooshtary regarding the “extreme hardship” that his family would face other than generalities about having to move his family elsewhere, anticipated difficulties in finding work, and anticipated loss of friends. Such generalities are, of course, present when one moves to a new location. As we have stated before, “[t]he common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.” Hassan, 927 F.2d at 468 , citing Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 499 (9th Cir.1986). Extreme hardship “will not be found absent a showing of significant actual or potential injury.” Id., citing Matter of Ngai, 19 I & N Dec. 245 (BIA 1984). The Board responded in kind to the generalities advanced by Shooshtary:

Although we require the Board to state its reasons and properly consider all factors, Hassan, 927 F.2d at 467 , the preciseness we require of the Board depends upon the preciseness of the proof offered by the petitioner. Here, Shooshtary provided only generalities. The Board’s response was sufficient.

We hold that the generalities set forth by Shooshtary do not meet the burden required for showing extreme hardship. Thus, there was no basis for the attorney general to grant Shooshtary the waiver he sought. Therefore, the Board did not abuse its discretion.

Ill

Finally, Shooshtary argued on appeal that our recent ease of Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 *1052 F.3d 1562 (9th Cir.1994), required the Board to consider rehabilitation as a factor when deciding a claim such as Shooshtary’s.

That argument is wrong. Rashtabadi held that the Board must take rehabilitation into account when determining whether an adjustment in status is to be granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (a). Here, however, the issue is not whether an adjustment in status is to be granted, but rather whether Shooshtary is eligible for an adjustment in status. Rashtabadi first found that Rashtabadi was eligible for a status change because a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation existed. Id. at 1570 .

This case is thus one step removed from Rashtabadi — we are concerned here with whether a waiver of admissibility was properly refused by the Board for lack of “extreme hardship.” Rashtabadi , on the other hand, had already answered the threshold question of whether Rashtabadi was eligible for admission under section 1255(a)(2). Having determined that 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2) did not make Rashtabadi ineligible for an adjustment of status, the case found that rehabilitation must be considered when deciding whether to grant the change of status.

Therefore, Rashtabadi does not help Shooshtary. The Board is simply under no obligation to consider rehabilitation as a factor when deciding whether to grant a waiver of admissibility based on extreme hardship under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (h)(1)(B).

PETITION DENIED.