Richard Allan Moran v. Salvador Godinez, Warden

40 F.3d 1567 Richard Allan MORAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Salvador GODINEZ, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. No. 91-15609. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted April 25, 1994. Submission Deferred May 16, 1994. Resubmitted July 1, 1994. Decided Nov. 15, 1994. Cal J. Potter, III, Las Vegas, NV, and Edward Chikofsky, Washington College of Law, The American University, Washington, DC, for petitioner-appellant. David Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, NV, for respondent-appellee. On Remand from the United States Supreme Court. Before: FARRIS, PREGERSON and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge THOMPSON; Dissent by Judge PREGERSON. DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge: 1 Richard Allan Moran pleaded guilty to three counts of capital murder and was sentenced to death by a Nevada state court. After exhausting his state court appeals, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 . The district court denied his petition and Moran appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 2 On August 13, 1984, Moran summoned…

I dissent.

I believe that the trial judge did not conduct an adequate inquiry to determine whether Moran’s fateful decision to dismiss his counsel was animated by his own free will, or whether, instead, it was the product of state-prescribed drugs affecting Moran’s precarious mental state.

The majority’s analysis is flawed on two fronts. First, the failure of the trial judge to conduct an adequate inquiry violated Moran’s constitutional procedural right, under Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 , 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), to a hearing to evaluate his mental competence whenever a doubt about such competence is raised. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, failure to hold such a hearing cannot be cured by a post-conviction hearing, years after the fact, in wMch the defendant is allocated the burden of retrospectively proving Ms competency.

Second, the judge’s failure to conduct a proper inquiry calls into question whether Moran’s guilty plea and waiver of right to counsel were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily tendered. The majority gives short shrift to Moran’s strong argument that Ms waiver of constitutional rights was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.…

Opinion by Judge THOMPSON; Dissent by Judge PREGERSON.

Richard Allan Moran pleaded guilty to three counts of capital murder and was sentenced to death by a Nevada state court. After exhausting his state court appeals, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . The district court denied his petition and Moran appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On August 13, 1984, Moran summoned police to the hospital room where he was recuperating from an attempted suicide. He confessed to killing his ex-wife at her home and two people at the Red Pearl Saloon. He was charged with three counts of capital murder. Initially, he pleaded not guilty to each count. Detailed facts of the murders and the circumstances of Moran’s confession are set forth in Godinez v. Moran, — U.S. -, — - —, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2682-84 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), and Moran v. State, 103 Nev. 138, 140-11 , 734 P.2d 712, 713 (1987).

On November 28, 1984, Moran appeared before the Nevada trial court. He said he wanted to discharge his attorneys and plead guilty to prevent the presentation…