United States v. Clarke Dexter Weems

Opinion by Judge SCHROEDER; Partial Concurrence by Judge William A. NORRIS.

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence for structuring financial transactions in violatibn of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (a)(3). The government concedes that appellant’s conviction must be reversed in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 655 , 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994), which held that in a prosecution for structuring financial transactions to avoid a bank’s reporting requirements, the government must prove that the defendant knew that structuring is illegal. The only substantial issues that we need discuss are whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the government from retrying the defendant, and whether the government is collaterally estopped on retrial from trying *530 to prove that the defendant knew that one of the properties he purchased with structured funds was being used to grow marijuana. We reverse^ and remand for retrial, with instructions to exclude the marijuana evidence relating to one of the properties.

I. BACKGROUND

In late 1987 and 1988, Clarke Weems purchased, with structured funds, properties known as the Enumclaw and Puyallup…

partially concurring:

I concur fully in Part I, but write separately because I disagree with the majority’s holding in Part II that the district court’s finding that Weems had no knowledge of the marijuana grow at the Puyallup property was necessary to the district court’s judgment that the Puyallup property was forfeitable because it was purchased with structured funds. 1 Majority Opinion at 532.

The district court in the civil forfeiture proceeding entered judgment ordering that “the property identified as [the Puyallup property] is hereby FORFEITED to the United States.” ER Tab 1 at 10. Thus, the Government was the prevailing party. The determination that Weems was an innocent owner, though fully and fairly litigated and decided, did not support the judgment in favor of the Government that the property *534 was forfeitable. The law in the Ninth Circuit is that a determination adverse to the prevailing party is not necessary to the judgment and is therefore generally not given preclusive effect. United States v. Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir.1994); see also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Int'l Mkt. Place, 773 F.2d 1068, 1069 (9th Cir.1985).

The three major…

49 F.3d 528 63 USLW 2607 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clarke Dexter WEEMS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 93-30151. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Feb. 1, 1994. Submission Vacated Feb. 8, 1994. Resubmitted March 15, 1994. Decided March 1, 1995. C. James Frush, Helsell, Fetterman, Martin, Todd & Hokanson, Seattle, WA, for defendant-appellant. Deborah Watson and Cynthia A. Young, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Before: GOODWIN, SCHROEDER and NORRIS, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge SCHROEDER; Partial Concurrence by Judge William A. NORRIS. SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge: 1 This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence for structuring financial transactions in violation of 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5324 (a)(3). The government concedes that appellant's conviction must be reversed in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 655 , 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994), which held that in a prosecution for structuring financial transactions to avoid a bank's reporting requirements, the…