dissenting:

. I respectfully dissent.

The majority holds that police officers, acting with, probable cause, but without a warrant, may arrest a citizen inside his or her home, merely because 'that citizen opens the door in response to their knock. This result is flatly contrary to Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), in which the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment “prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest.” Id. at 576 , 100 S.Ct. at 1375 .

In Payton , the Court drew a bright line at the physical entrance to the home, stating:

Id. at 589-90 , 100 S.Ct. at 1381-82 (citation omitted). In concluding that “seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” id. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. at 1380 , the Court left open only two ways for the government to overcome that presumption: a showing of exigent circumstances or a showing of consent to the entry. 1 On the record below, the government failed to make a showing of either. 2

The record does not indicate, and the majority does not contend, that Vaneaton gave his consent for the officers to enter his motel room. In response to a knock, Vaneaton looked through his window, saw the uniformed officers, and opened his door. He was standing inside the room. 3 When asked by the officers, he said that he was Jack Vaneaton. The officers advised him that he was under arrest, entered the room, and handcuffed him. At no time did Vaneaton ask the officers into his room, step back to allow them to enter, 4 or indicate in any other way that he consented to their entry. Mere submission to the implied authority of uniformed police officers at one’s door does not imply consent. See United States v. Shaibu 920 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1990).

Finding no consent to enter in this case, the majority manufactures a third exception to Payton’s firm line, arguing that Vaneaton “voluntarily exposed” himself to arrest. However, the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Circuit do not support the existence of a “voluntary exposure” exception.

The Supreme Court reiterated its Payton holding in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 , 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990). The facts in Harris were simple, and remarkably like the case at bench: “When the police arrived, they knocked on the door, displaying their guns and badges. Harris let them enter. Once inside, the officers read Harris his rights ...” Id. at 15-16 , 110 S.Ct. at 1642 . The Court accepted the trial court’s finding that Harris did not consent to the officers’ entry into his home, and held, “It is *1429 also evident, in light of Payton , that arresting Harris in his home without an arrest warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 16-17, 110 S.Ct. at 1642 .

The sanctity of the firm line at the doorway is evident when one considers the result in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 96 S.Ct. 2406 , 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). There the Court upheld the warrantless arrest of a defendant who was standing within the frame of her doorway as the officers approached, and who then retreated into her home, where the officers followed and arrested her. The Court held that the defendant, who was standing on her threshold, was in a “public place,” where “[s]he was not merely visible to the public but was exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house.” Id. at 42 , 96 S.Ct. at 2409 . 5

Ignoring the firm line drawn by Payton , the majority contends that Vaneaton, while not in a “public place” like the Santana defendant, voluntarily relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy when he opened the door in response to the police knock. In reaching this conclusion the majority relies principally on United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 537 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), and United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 , 104 S.Ct. 1593 , 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984).

In Johnson , the police were found to have acted illegally in making their arrest, where the defendant opened his door in response to a knock by police officers who gave fictitious names. This court held, “In light of the strong language by the Court in Payton , emphasizing the special protection the Constitution affords to individuals within their homes, we find that the warrantless arrest of Johnson, while he stood within his home, after having opened the door in response to false identification by the agents, constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 757.

While Johnson suggests that a contrary result might obtain if the police had not used subterfuge, it did not so hold. Nor has this court ever so held.

In Whitten , the court upheld the warrant-less arrest of defendant Gaiefsky, who opened the door of his hotel room, but was standing “in the doorway” when arrested. 706 F.2d at 1015 . Whitten distinguished Gaiefsky’s arrest from those in Payton by noting that, “A doorway ... unlike the interior of a hotel room, is a public place.” Id. (emphasis added). Necessarily implicit in the Whitten decision is the conclusion that, had Gaiefsky been standing inside, as Vanea-ton was, the warrantless arrest would not have been legal. 6

In United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 , 106 S.Ct. 2255 , 90 L.Ed.2d 700 (1986), this court reversed the conviction of a defendant who was arrested when he stepped outside of his trailer in response to an order given' over a bullhorn by police, who had completely surrounded the dwelling and who had their weapons drawn. In finding an illegal arrest, the court held that the defendant “did not voluntarily expose himself to [police] view or control outside his trailer but only emerged under circumstances of extreme coercion.” Id. at 893 (emphasis added). Al -Azzawy, which is fully consistent with Santana , makes clear that one may voluntarily expose oneself to arrest only by stepping outside of one’s home not by remaining within it. 7

Thus, Johnson and subsequent Ninth Circuit cases do not stand for the proposition that anytime one “voluntarily” opens the door in response to a knock by uniformed police officers, one voluntarily exposes oneself to warrantless arrest. This court has consistently reaffirmed the line drawn by the *1430 Supreme Court at the entrance to the home. See Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1426 ; Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d at 893 n. 1; Johnson, 626 F.2d at 753 . The majority’s contrary conclusion is clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton . 8

The majority’s- opinion is also bad policy. It will have the effect of discouraging private citizens from answering knocks on the door by uniformed police officers, by subjecting citizens to warrantless arrests inside their own homes, stemming from nothing more than the exercise of common courtesy in answering a police officer’s knock on the door. Indeed, it provides a justification for refusing to answer a police officer’s knock. 9 The result is bound to make routine police investigation more difficult and further to strain relations between the citizenry and police.

While making police work more difficult, the majority’s decision simultaneously erodes the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. The majority has, quite literally, opened the door to warrantless invasions of the home, ignoring the Supreme Court’s warning that “the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ” Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 , 100 S.Ct. at 1379 (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 , 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)).

Because the police crossed Payton’s bright line and, in doing so, violated Vaneaton’s Fourth Amendment rights, I would vacate Vaneaton’s conviction and reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to .suppress the evidence obtained as the fruit of this unconstitutional conduct.

. The Court stated, “Absent exigent circumstances, [the] threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 , 100 S.Ct. at 1382 (emphasis added). The Court implicitly held thaf Warrantless arrests inside the home were permissible when police entry into the home was consensual. "[W]e are dealing with entries into homes make without the consent of any occupant.” Id. at 583 , 100 S.Ct. at 1378 .

. As an alternative to its "doorway exposure” argument, the government also argued that exigent circumstances justified the arrest. The majority shuns this argument, as well it should.

The behavior of the two uniformed officers who approached Vaneaton's door belies any exigency. They approached and knocked with their guns holstered. Vaneaton could not have escaped. A third officer was stationed in front of the motel room and a fourth at the back of the motel, the only other exit from Vaneaton's room. With Vaneaton completely surrounded and unable to escape, there was nothing to prevent the officers from obtaining a telephonic warrant for his arrest. This also is not a drug- case in which there may be some justifiable apprehension that evidence might be flushed down the toilet or otherwise destroyed. Thus, nothing in the record suggests that exigent circumstances existed in this case.

. The majorhy states that, "At the moment of his arrest, Vaneaton was standing at the doorway but just inside the threshold.” Under our circuit law, it is unquestioned' that Vaneaton was arrested within his home. "In these circumstances [where the officers are outside and the suspect is inside his home], it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest ’ occurs within the home.” United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 537 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). See also, United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 892-93 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 , 106 S.Ct. 2255 , 90 L.Ed.2d 700 (1986).

. This case is distinguishable from United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1993), where the court found that the defendant had consented to police entry of his apartment by stepping back and saying "okay” in response to a police request to talk.

. The Court justified the officers’ actual entry into the defendant’s home under the doctrine of hot pursuit.

. As in the instant case, there is no indication in Whitten that the police used subterfuge to get the defendant to open his door.

. United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430 (9th Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 441 U.S. 944 , 99 S.Ct. 2162 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1979), also cited by the majority in support of its opinion, was decided before Payton .

. Even if the majority were correct that one voluntarily exposes oneself to arrest by opening one’s door, our opinion in Shaibu suggests that Vaneaton's behavior in this case was not voluntary. In Shaibu , which followed Johnson by a decade, this court held that consent to police entry of a dwelling could not be inferred where the defendant met the police outside his apartment, then walked back into the apartment, leaving the door open as the detectives followed him inside. 920 F.2d at 1423 . Relying on Payton , this court noted, "We do not expect others to walk in to our homes, even if the door is open, without first requesting permission to enter.” Id. at 1427. The court also noted that the mere presence of police may rob the defendant's actions of their consensual or voluntary character:

Id. (citations omitted). Here, Vaneaton saw the police officers through his window before opening the door; his response, opening the door in response to their knock, was obtained trader col- or of the badge.

. The "voluntary exposure” exception to the Pay-ton rule also introduces confusion, rather than offering clear guidance to the police. Undoubtedly, we will soon be facing issues of whether appearing at a' closed screen door, or a glass door, or even an open window is sufficient to trigger the voluntary exposure exception. Courts will also have to decide how far inside the home and away from the doorway a citizen must be to escape the voluntary exposure exception. Is it inches? Is it two feet, five feet, 10 feet? Would it be sufficient, regardless of the distance from ' the doorway, if the suspect were visible through an open doorway with the naked eye? Would the use of binoculars void the exception?