Theresa Peay-Wainwright v. Kqed, Inc.

51 F.3d 282 NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Theresa PEAY-WAINWRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KQED, INC., Defendant-Appellee. No. 93-16969. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Submitted March 16, 1995. * Decided March 29, 1995. Before: NORRIS, WIGGINS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges. 1 MEMORANDUM ** 2 Theresa Peay-Wainwright appeals the district court's order granting KQED's motion for summary judgment in her employment-discrimination action. We affirm. DISCUSSION 3 We engage in a three-step analysis when we review the merits of a claim brought under Title VII. First, we must determine whether Peay-Wainwright established a prima facie case of employment discrimination. To do so, she must have offered evidence that would give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If she established a prima facie case of discrimination, KQED then…