This case is before the court upon exceptions to the libel. It is alleged that the American Trading Company of New Orleans delivered to the Fairhaven 2,812 bags of sugar at Chinandega. When the vessel was about half a mile out from Gordon Head Lighthouse, she stranded, and, although efforts were made to relieve her, she settled by the head and took a list to port. Water accumulated in the forward part of the hold, and, in a short time, the bilges showed over two feet of water aft and more than four feet of water over the ship’s ceiling forward. The water extended over dunnage, and came in contact with the sugar, causing the damage and loss.

There is no allegation whatsoever that the ship was unseaworthy, nor was not properly manned, nor, indeed, any charge that the stranding was due to any negligence.

Section 3 of the Harter Act (Comp. St. § 8031) provides:

In The Warren Adams, 74 F. 414 , 20 C. C. A. 488 , the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said:

The third edition of Arnold on Insurance, at page 687, defines “perils of the sea” as “all kinds of marine casualties such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding, etc., and every species of damage to the ship or goods at sea, by the violent and immediate action of the waters and waves, not comprehended in the ordinary wear and tear of the voyage or directly referable to the acts and negligence of the assured as its approximate cause.”

It may perhaps be said that, prior to the Harter Act, the question as to whether stranding was a peril of the sea and within the exception might depend upon the facts or circumstances. This is perhaps indicated by the general discussion of that subject in Carver on Carriage by Sea, p. 119, where it would seem that, in the view of the author, stranding is a peril of the sea only when it is upon not generally known reefs, or upon known reefs when the vessel has lost her course owing to fog or other causes, without any want of skill or care. Such, however, is not the ease in this country since the enactment of the Harter Act.

I do not think the libel states a cause of action, and the exceptions will therefore be sustained.