Campbell

Campbell v. United States

Good Law
12 F.2d 873·1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 3401
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitApril 30, 1926No. 4671California4,191 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

McCamant, J.

The first count of the indictment, on which alone the defendant was convicted, charges that the defendant, together with Bloomhuff and Dailey, had devised a scheme to defraud by the organization of an oil stock promotion company under the guise of a trust estate to be known as Gordon Campbell-Kevin Syndicate No. 2; that the scheme involved the sale to investors of 25,000 shares or units of the par value of $10 each; that the scheme contemplated the sale of these shares or units by false representations, and the appropriation by the defendant, Bloomhuff, and Dailey of large sums of money so realized to the use of the defendant, Bloomhuff, Dailey, Gordon'Campbell Syndicate No. 1, and others. The indictment sets up in detail a number of the false and fraudulent representations made for the purpose of selling said shares, and alleges that on the 21st of June, 1922, the defendant and his associates, in furtherance of their scheme, placed in the post office at Kevin, Mont., a circular addressed to C. M. Curry, at Alberton, Mont.

The evidence abundantly sustained the allegations of the indictment. There was realized from the sales of shares the sum of $124,-993.09. Of this sum…

Dissenting Opinion

Rudkin, J.

I dissent. The charge to the jury was largely argumentative in form and favored the government throughout. Inferences of fact were placed on the same footing as inferences of law, and no distinction whatever was made between implied fraud and actual fraud. In the end the verdict was made to turn upon the abstract legal right of the accused to pay commissions on sales of shares out of the proceeds of such sales, regardless of his belief or good faith in the premises. Indeed, no attempt was made on the oral argument to uphold the charge of the court, but the government pleaded for affirmance on the sole ground that the proof of guilt was so overwhelming that errors committed during the progress of the trial were not prejudicial. With such a contention I am unable to agree, A fair and impartial *878 trial by jury is tbe constitutional right of every person accused of crime, whether guilty or innocent, and that constitutional guaranty is not satisfied by a partisan, one-sided charge to the jury.

To show that my characterization of the charge is not overdrawn, I quote therefrom as follows:

“Now, here is another obligation on the part of this manager of the joint adventure; He is not…

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