This is an appeal from an order of forfeiture and sale of two Graham trucks, entered in pursuance of proceedings under a libel filed by the district attorney under the provisions of section 3453 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (26 USCA § 1185). The appellant sold the trucks in question to Melville Weiss under a conditional sales contract, and there is! still $2,036.94 owing on the purchase price on each truck. Appellant claimed in the lower court that the prohibition agents seized the trucks for a violation of section 26, tit. 2, of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA § 40), and not for a violation of section 345O' or section 3453, Rev. St. (26 USCA §§ 1181, 1182, 1185), and therefore, being without knowledge of the unlawful use of said trucks, it is entitled to the return thereof in accordance with the provisions of section 26 of the National Prohibition Act. The parties in the lower court stipulated the facts to be as follows:

It is also stipulated that the appellant was the owner of the conditional sales contract and had no knowledge of the illegal use of the tracks, and that the balance due tbereon was as alleged.

The appeal presents only two questions— whether there was sufficient showing of nonpayment of tax on the spirits manufactured at the premises where the tracks were found; and whether the escaping track was “within the yard” within the meaning of section 3453, Rev. St. (26 USCA § 1185).

From the facts stipulated, the trial court was justified in drawing the inference that the distillery was being used in fraud of internal revenue laws and with design to avoid the payment of taxes within the meaning of section 3453. According to the stipulation, there was a distillery in active operation, with a 40 horse power steam boiler with 120 pounds’ steam pressure, reasonably requiring supervision, but with no one visible in charge of the premises or of the operations. The only person appearing at the premises was the track driver with a companion track to the one already on the premises, which was purchased at the same time, by tbe same individual, upon tbe same terms, wbicb track, as tbe one already there, was loaded with 5-gallon cans. This track driver promptly escaped from the premises without unloading, and abandoned tbe track upon tbe highway, and fled upon tbe approach of prohibition officers. From these facts the conclusion is irresistible that the operations carried on were not only a violation of the prohibition law, but also with tbe intent of avoiding tbe payment of revenue tax on the spirits there distilled.

The next question is whether or not the second track which escaped from the premises was “within the yard” within the meaning of that term as used in 26 USCA § 1185. The track was actually within the yard at the time it was obseved by the prohibition officers. Apparently in order to avoid the seizure thereof, the driver, without unloading his empty cans, brought there to be delivered, fled with the load. He abandoned the track in the road upon the approach of the prohibition officers. Clearly the track was “within the yard” within the meaning of 26 USCA § 1185, and the fact that it had temporarily escaped therefrom in an apparent attempt to avoid seizure does not prevent seizure thereof by tbe officers wbo were pursuing it for that purpose.

Order affirmed.