Luse

This ease is before us for the second time, on a conviction for perjury in giving false testimony as a witness in a mail fraud case in which appellant was one of the defendants. In directing' a reversal and a remand, the opinion, 49 F.(2d) 241 , differentiated the first and the third counts. As to tho latter it was stated that a verdict should have been directed for defendant; as to the former, the reversal was for errors in the admission of certain testimony. On the new trial, which was very properly confined to the first count, substantially tho same evidence, except that which had been held to have been erroneously admitted, was again introduced. Defendant was again convicted.

The same objections as had been urged on the former appeal, both to the admission of the testimony given in tho mail fraud ease by certain witnesses and to the materiality of defendant's allegedly false testimony in that case in relation to the issues therein, were again made in the trial court and are again sought to be raised on this appeal. Tn view of the decision of this court and the reasons therefor ns set forth in Judge Wilbur’s opinion, the trial judge properly deemed himself precluded from…