June 5, 1933, appellee brought an action in personam in the state court against the Honolulu Oil Corporation, Limited, alleging that he had been employed by that company as an accountant at a salary of $300 per month; that the employment was to continue as long as his work was satisfactory; and that he was discharged without cause, to his damage in the sum of $30,000. The case was removed to the United States District Court by the Oil Company on the ground of diversity of citizenship* and is still pending there. After removal, appellee brought a second action in the state court against the Oil Company, stating the same cause of action, but reducing the damages claimed to $2,500, and joining as defendants with the Oil Company two of its officers, namely, A. C. Mattei and A. C. Diericx. Because of the absence of diversity of citizenship between the litigants and lack of jurisdictional amount, the second case cannot be removed to the federal court.

Upon the filing of the second action, the Oil Company, appellant herein, instituted in the court below a suit in equity to enjoin appellee from proceeding further with the second action filed in the state court, upon the theory that the United States District Court had exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the pendency of the first ease in that court, since the cause of action in both cases was the same. The injunction was denied and the suit.dismissed for want of equity; followed by this appeal.

We are of opinion that the suit was properly dismissed under the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U. S. 226 , 43 S. Ct. 79, 81 , 67 L. Ed. 226 , 24 A. L. R. 1077, where it was held that a subsequent state suit did not interfere with a previous federal suit on the same cause of action, the action being in personam (as the case at bar), and the custody of specific property not being involved. The facts of the Kline Case are as follows: The Construction Company brought an action at law for breach of ■ contract in the federal court against Kline and others. The jury disagreed. Subsequent to the commencement of that action, Kline brought a suit in equity in the state court against the Construction Company and the sureties on its contract, alleging breach of contract. To the action brought by the Construction Company in the federal court, Kline filed an answer and cross-complaint setting up substantially the same matters set forth in the bill brought in the state court. To the equity suit brought by Kline in the state court, the Construction Company filed an answer and cross-complaint setting up the matters charged in its action at law filed in the federal court. The two cases presented substantially tilt: same issues, the only differences being the addition of the sureties as parties defendant in the equity suit. Both actions were in personam, the relief sought being a money judgment.

Upon petition of the Construction Company, and on the ground of diversity of citizenship, the equity suit was removed to the federal court. Upon motion of Kline, the *655 suit was remanded to the state court. After the mistrial of the action at law in the federal court, the Construction Company sought to enjoin Kline from further prosecuting the equity suit in the state court. The United States District Court denied the injunction, but that ruling was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 271 F. 605 . In reversing the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said:

We seo no reason why the rule of the Kline Case should not be applied to the case at bar. Appellee seeks only a personal judgment, and the prosecution in the state court of his asserted right will not “tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the [federal] court in which [Ms] prior action for the same cause is pending.” Kline Case, supra.

It is true that the case at bar was commenced in the state court and subsequently removed to the federal court, whereas in the Kline Case the previously pending suit had been begun in tbe federal court. But the removal statute (28 USCA § 72) provides that, after removal, “the cause shall then proceed in the samé manner as if it had been originally commenced in the said district court.” And as said in Stewart Land Co. v. Arthur (C. C. A. 8) 267 F. 184, 185 , cited with approval in the Kline Case: “The pendency of two or more such [personal] actions between the same parties upon the same causes of action in different jurisdictions gives to the court in which the first was *656 brought no power to enjoin the prosecution of the others.”

In that ease, the plaintiff had brought an action in the federal court seeking to recover from defendant upon certain negotiable instruments. Thereafter plaintiff brought a similar action in the state court. An injunction was sought against the latter action, and, as we have indicated, it was denied.

We conclude therefore that the filing of appellee’s second action in the state court does not interfere with the progress of the first, or tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the federal court to which the first action has been removed, and that there is no ground for an injunction staying proceedings in the second action filed in the state court.

Affirmed.