From the decree of the District Court of the United States for the District of Arizona dismissing its amended bill of complaint in equity appellant brings this appeal.

It appears from the amended bill of complaint that the appellant’s elaim for $6,342.-51 against the estate of W. T. Smith, deceased, based upon decedent’s written guaranty, was presented to the administrator with the will annexed of said estate within the time allowed for such presentment; that no action was taken thereon, either allowing or rejecting the same within ten days after presentment, and no action was filed on said claim within three months thereafter.

Sections 3987 and 3989 of the Eevised Code of Arizona 1928 provide as follows:

Appellee contends that under these sections of the Eevised Code of Arizona the claim of appellant is barred, and that the administrator has the positive duty of interposing the nonelaim statute as a defense to the tardy suit. Appellant, on the other hand, contends that “a court of equity has power to grant relief and toll the statute of limitations in cases where the claimant is not guilty of culpable negligence in failing to file or bring suit on his claim and where the due administration of the estate will not be delayed by the court’s action.” Appellant claims to be free from culpable negligence in failing to bring suit on its claim within the three months’ period because of its reliance upon statements made in letters written to it and to its attorneys by the attorneys for the appellee. These letters are attached as exhibits to the amended bill of complaint, and the statement therein most strongly relied on by appellant is as follows: “We may say in this regard that our probate law and procedure is almost identical with that of California, and any procedure followed in California in such regard usually applies in this state.” In this same letter appellant was advised by appellee’s attorneys to turn the matter over to its attorneys which it did. Also appellant contends that in subsequent letters from appellee’s attorneys it was led to believe that it would be notified by the administrators or their attorneys if and when the claim was allowed or rejected. It is conceded by appellant that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation involved, but merely a misstatement of fact which was relied on by appellant to its detriment.

Appellant has cited numerous cases in support of its position, but, as pointed oul by appellee, they are all cases from jurisdictions (Iowa and Massachusetts) having a special statutory provision permitting relief in such cases. The Arizona law does not provide for any exceptions to its nonclaim statute (Eev. Code of Arizona 1928, §§ 3987, *386 3989, supra), and if suit is not brought on a claim within three months after'its rejection, even though such rejection is constructive under the statute, it is forever barred.

The general rule is stated in 24 C. J. § Í968 as follows: “As the usual effect of a failure to observe the requirements of statutes limiting the time for presenting claims against the estate of a decedent, or for bringing action against executors or administrators, is to bar the right as well as the remedy, the bar created by these statutes cannot be waived by the personal representatives.” In absence of a special statute making exceptions to the bar of the statute resulting from a failure to present a' claim or bring action upon a rejected claim within the time allowed, the courts are powerless to relieve the claimant who has failed to comply with the statute. See Notes in 11 A. L. R. 246; 66 A. L. R. 1415. As stated in Bancroft’s Probate Practice,' § 892: “Misleading statements, assurances, or conduct of the representative inducing a creditor to omit compliance with the statutes in presenting a claim or suing upon such claim do not es-top the representative from contesting the claim upon the ground of non-compliance with statutory requirements. A fortiori, the conduet of the representative’s attorney cannot operate to estop the representative in such matters.” To the same effect, see Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 48 Mont. 448 , 138 P. 772 .

A federal court of equity cannot relieve a claimant from the consequences of his failure to comply with the nonclaim statutes of the state of the domicile of decedent unless there is also a statute of that state permitting an action against the personal representative, notwithstanding the statutory limitation, in case justice and equity require it. This rule was stated by the Supreme Court in Security Trust Co. v. Black River Nat. Bank, 187 U. S. 211, 227 , 23 S. Ct. 52, 58 , 47 L. Ed. 147 , as follows:

Decree affirmed.