The Dollar Steamship Line brought an action under the “Tucker Act” (28 USCA § 41, cl. 20), against the United States to recover $5,043.81. The case was tried upon admitted and stipulated facts, and a judgment was rendered in favor of the United States. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.

According to the undisputed facts, the Dollar Steamship Line transported the United States mail from ports in the United States (New York City and Jacksonville, Fla., via Havana) to the Canal Zone. Manifests were made up by the postmasters showing the kinds and weights of mails transported on the President ships during December, 1925, and January, 1926, and payment was asked by the Steamship Company, upon the basis that the mails so transported to the Canal ’ Zone' were foreign mails. Shortly before this, the Comptroller General of the United States had held that where post offices are established to serve United States forces in foreign ports, such offices are to be classed as “domestic offices” and that, therefore, such mails are to be considered domestic mails. The accounts submitted for December, 1925, and January, 1926, in so far as they covered mail carried to the United States forces on the Canal Zone by the Dollar Steamship Line, were not paid at the foreign mail rates.

For some time prior to the transportation of the mails involved in this controversy, appellant transported mails for appellee to the same ports and was paid at the rate provided for the transportation of foreign mail. Accounts were prepared in appellant’s, favor and approved by the Postmaster General on the basis that the mails so handled and transported were foreign mails, which entitled the appellant to compensation amounting to $6,100.51. The General Accounting Office concluded that the rate applicable for transportation of mails between ports of the United States and the Canal Zone was ^ that applying between ports in the United States and its possessions, and reduced the accounts to make them aggregate $1,044.10, or $5,056.41 less than the amount approved by the Postmaster General, and appellant was paid the lesser amount.

On March 29, 1926, appellant communicated with the Post Office Department by-letter reading:

To this letter the Post Office Department replied by letter of date April 22, 1926, containing the following statements:

A letter from the Comptroller General to appellant of date May 6, 1926, contained the statement:

A letter from appellant addressed to General Accounting Office, Post Office Department Division, of date May 27, 1926, contains, among others, the following statements :

A letter from the General Accounting Office, Post Office Department Division and signed by the Comptroller General, addressed to appellant of date June 7, 1926, reads:

Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. United States, 280 U. S. 173 , 50 S. Ct. 148 , 74 L. Ed. 356 , decided January 6, 1930, appellant on May 15, 1930, addressed a letter to the Comptroller General containing, among other statements, the following: “Inasmuch as Canal Zone ports have been held to be foreign ports we are submitting our claim against the Government for $5,-043.81, difference between amount paid us for mail carried under domestic rates and what we should have been paid at foreign mail rates, all of which we trust you will find in order.”

Of date June 14, 1930, the Comptroller General replied by letter containing, among other statements, the following:

Of date July 11, 1930, appellant’s attorney replied to the letter of the Comptroller General. In the letter of reply, among other statements, appears the following:

To the letter last referred to, the Comptroller General of date August 4, 1930, replied, and from which letter we quote the following excerpts:

The law governing a case of this character is stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Brandeis in St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. United States, 268 U. S. 169, 174 , 45 S. Ct. 472, 474 , 69 L. Ed. 899 , as follows: “No action of these officials can bar the right of a claimant to have the Court of Claims determine whether he is entitled to recover under a contract with the government. [Citing authorities.] The right to invoke the legal remedy may be lost by the claimant’s failure to invoke it within the statutory period of limitations. But the substantive right to recover an amount confessedly due can be lost only through some act or omission on the part of the claimant which, under the rules of the common law as applied by this court to claims against the government, discharges the cause of action. Acquiescence by the claimant in the payment by the government of a smaller amount than is due will ordinarily effect the discharge. ' Acquiescence can be established by showing conduct before the payment which might have led the government to believe that the amount allowed was all that was claimed, or that such amount, if paid, would be received in full satisfaction of the claim. Acquiescence can, also, be established by showing conduct after the payment which might have led the government to believe that the amount actually received was accepted in full satisfaction of the original claim. But to constitute acquiescence within the meaning of this rule, something more than acceptance of the smaller sum without protest must be shown. There must have been some conduct on the part of the creditor akin to abandonment or waiver or from which an estoppel might arise.”

The evidence submitted in this case establishes such acquiescence upon the part of the claimant in the payment by the government of a smaller amount than was legally due as bars a right of recovery. When advised of the ruling of the Comptroller General, which ruling was clearly upon a ques *447 tion of law, claimant made no protest or contention that there was error in such ruling. Upon the contrary, the only request made was for “a schedule of these rates”; for advice “in order to estimate the mail revenue,” and that the postmasters “separate the revenue accruing from their ports to the Canal Zone * * * the port which takes the foreign rate from the amount which takes the domestic rate.” It was not until nearly four years later, following^the decision in the Luckenbach Steamship Company Case, supra, that any claim was made for additional payment. This case falls within the rule applied in the following cases: Louisville & N. R. R. v. United States, 267 U. S. 395 , 45 S. Ct. 233 , 69 L. Ed. 678 ; New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 32 , 42 S. Ct. 209 , 66 L. Ed. 448 ; Oregon-Washington R. R. Co. v. United States, 255 U. S. 339 , 41 S. Ct. 329 , 65 L. Ed. 667 ; Western Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 255 U. S. 349 , 41 S. Ct. 332 , 65 L. Ed. 671 ; United States v. Garlinger, 169 U. S. 316 , 18 S. Ct. 364 , 42 L. Ed. 762 ; Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 164 U. S. 93, 99 , 17 S. Ct. 35 , 41 L. Ed 362; Philadelphia & Baltimore Central Railroad Co. v. United States, 103 U. S. 703 , 26 L. Ed. 454 ; White Oak Canal Co. v. United States (C. C. A.) 15 F.(2d) 474 .

Judgment affirmed.

50 S. Ct. 148 , 74 L. Ed. 356 .