Hall

Hall v. United States

Good Law
84 F.2d 628·18 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 178·1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4564
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJune 29, 1936No. 8000California1,099 words

Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Haney, J.

(dissenting).

The statement of facts set out in the majority opinion suffices for what is hereinbelow said. The question as there stated is whether or not the amount paid by appellant was “for admission.”

The regulations quoted show that the term “admission” means the right or privilege to enter into a place.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, I dissent from the holding of the majority, that “the payment for admission occurred at the time the $100 was paid and not at the time the scrip coupons were surrendered.” .

There is no allegation that appellant had a right or privilege to enter the stadium on the scrip alone, without a ticket. The inference from the provisions of the contract quoted, if there is any inference at all, is that a scrip holder did not have a right to enter the stadium without a ticket. In the absence of an allegation that the scrip purchased by appellant entitled him to entry without a ticket, I am of the opinion that his complaint fails to state a cause of action, for it does not disclose that the amount paid was for “admission” as defined by the Regulations, but for “scrip.” Appellant would be entitled to a refund only if in 1930 he paid for “admission,”…

Lead Opinion

Wilbur, J.

We adopt the following statement of the facts and issues as prepared by Judge Haney:

“This appeal is taken from a judgment in an action brought by appellant to recover the sum of $1, alleged to have been illegally collected from him as an ‘admission’ tax. Appellee filed a demurrer to the complaint which was sustained, and the judgment was entered after appellant failed to amend.

“It is alleged in the complaint that appellant, on May 5, 1930, paid to the Associated Students of the University of California $100 and received a certain booklet containing ‘scrip coupons’ and a written agreement of the parties. The material provisions of the agreement are:

“1. The registered owner hereof has the option to purchase at the established price two tickets * * * for each California-Stanford football game * * * during the academic years 1931-1932 to 1940-1941, inclusive, paying therefor either in cash or scrip.

“2. Subject to the conditions herein stated the scrip contained herein will be redeemed at face value in payment for tickets. * * *

“3. In no event will scrip be redeemed in cash.”

Other provisions referred to the “rights represented hereby.” Each of the scrip coupons contained…

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