Angel Martel v. County of Los Angeles Elias Cuevas Harry Delong Richard Mariadiaga Mark Shaughnessy

56 F.3d 993 31 Fed.R.Serv.3d 769 Angel MARTEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Elias Cuevas; Harry Delong; Richard Mariadiaga; Mark Shaughnessy, et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 91-56268. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted April 7, 1993. Decided April 12, 1994. Order Granting Rehearing En Banc Nov. 14, 1994. Argued and Submitted Jan. 19, 1995. Decided June 1, 1995. Thomas E. Beck, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff-appellant. Douglas J. Collodel, Morris, Polich & Purdy, and Robert S. Wolfe, Manning, Marder & Wolfe, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before: WALLACE, C.J., FLETCHER, POOLE, D.W. NELSON, CANBY, REINHARDT, BEEZER, WIGGINS, BRUNETTI, RYMER, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge BEEZER; Concurrence by Judge CANBY; Dissents by Judge KLEINFELD, Judge REINHARDT, and Judge FLETCHER BEEZER, Circuit Judge: 1 We consider whether a district court's denial of a motion for continuance for purposes of conducting discovery is reversible absent an affirmative demonstration of actual and substantial prejudice to the moving party.…

dissenting, with whom Judges FLETCHER and REINHARDT concur:

I respectfully dissent.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 specifically states that the rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Sometimes serving one purpose tends to disserve another. For example, it is typical of bicycle engineering that one tries to build a lightweight, inexpensive, sturdy frame. But the better one serves any two goals, the worse one serves the third. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure braid pretrial practice around discovery, one cannot go too far toward one of the three desiderata, “just, speedy, and inexpensive,” without sacrificing one or two of the others. By requiring a showing of prejudice which is, as a practical matter, impossible, we unreasonably disable ourselves from reviewing whether denial of a continuance is an abuse of discretion.

I. FACTS

The declarations of counsel in district court and the pretrial materials set out facts, though there is some contradiction. They appear to be as follows. Angel Martel is a paranoid schizophrenic. On June 6,1990, the day of his violent…

joined by D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I concur in the result reached by the majority, but like Judge Kleinfeld, I take issue with the majority’s formulation of the requisite showing of “actual and substantial prejudice.”

Judge Kleinfeld is quite correct in stating that Martel cannot be expected to show what facts he would have discovered if he had been given time to depose the defendant deputies. As its name implies, “discovery” is the process of learning that which is previously un *998 known. It is therefore unrealistic for the majority opinion to require Martel to show “what, if any, facts would have been gained from additional discovery.” I also share Judge Kleinfeld’s concerns with the “rocket docket.”

On the other hand, I agree with Judge Beezer that we cannot assess the denial of an opportunity for discovery in a total vacuum. We must pay some attention to the possible effect on the outcome of the trial. See Martel v. County of Los Angeles, 34 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir.1994) (Norris, J., dissenting). Thus, I would require Martel to show that the denial of an opportunity to depose the defendant deputies might reasonably have had an effect on the…

Dissenting:

The majority opinion is what it is. Judge Kleinfeld’s dissent, in which I fully join, effectively disposes of its reasoning. However, Judge Canby’s concurrence, joined by Judge D.W. Nelson, is extremely disappointing. We should, as judges, be able to bring a little practical knowledge, understanding, and wisdom to the decision-making process. To suggest that in a case in which the plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by a number of sheriffs deputies, the testimony of those deputies could be anything but critical, or the denial of the right to take their depositions could be anything but harmful, is either incredibly naive or wholly elevates form over substance. We are here after all, as I am sure Judges Canby and Nelson would agree, to seek truth and do justice. What more need a plaintiff show other than that it was the alleged perpetrators of the constitutional wrong whose depositions he was precluded from taking? There is a limit to the Frankfurter view of jurisprudence. I think we exceed it here.

Moreover, if it were so critical that we determine from a transcript what we all know anyway, the Rules permit us to order what we need. See Federal Rule of Appellate…

Dissenting:

I concur wholeheartedly in Judge Klein-feld’s and Judge Reinhardt’s dissents. I simply add an additional perspective to their excellent opinions.

The majority declines to decide whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a continuance to allow the completion of discovery. It looks only to prejudice after trial.

I respectfully suggest it is important to a proper analysis and understanding of the district court’s role to decide whether the judge abused his discretion. 1 Why do I think it important? Whether the movant is likely to suffer prejudice from the denial of a continuance is an element of the determination that the district judge should make in granting or denying the opportunity for further discovery. The district judge would abuse his discretion if he prejudiced the plaintiffs ability to prepare his case. In this case, the judge broke his own court’s rules by shortening the minimum time the parties are allowed for preparation. Prejudice should be presumed — the burden to rebut prejudice then, should be on the defendants.

By its own admission, the majority concedes “the necessity and propriety of the force used ... was the primary issue at…

Opinion by Judge BEEZER; Concurrence by Judge CANBY; Dissents by Judge KLEINFELD, Judge REINHARDT, and Judge FLETCHER

We consider whether a district court’s denial of a motion for continuance for purposes of conducting discovery is reversible absent an affirmative demonstration of actual and substantial prejudice to the moving party. Angel Martel appealed the pretrial denial of a continuance following an unfavorable jury verdict in his civil rights action against the County of Los Angeles and eight individual law enforcement officers. We have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Initially, a divided panel reversed the district court, holding that Martel was entitled to a new trial. See Martel v. County of Los Angeles, 34 F.3d 731 (9th Cir.1994). A majority of the active, nonrecused judges of this court voted to rehear the case en banc. Martel v. County of Los Angeles, No. 91-56268, slip op. 14025 [ 34 F.3d 731, 742 ] (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 1994); Fed.R.App.P. 35(a); 9th Cir.R. 35-3.

Because we conclude that Martel failed to establish the necessary actual and substantial prejudice from the denial of his motion for a continuance to conduct additional discovery, we…