Richard Louis Arnold Phillips v. Daniel B. Vasquez, Warden, San Quentin State Prison

Caution
56 F.3d 1030·95 Daily Journal DAR 6705·1995 WL 319974·1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12695·95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3912
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMay 26, 199592-15828California11,045 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Reinhardt, J.

Opinion by Judge REINHARDT; Concurrence by Judge KLEINFELD.

It has been almost fifteen years since Richard Louis Arnold Phillips was convicted of murder and first sentenced to death, and ten years since the state supreme court affirmed his conviction and vacated his sentence. The question before us is whether we should now review the constitutionality of Phillips’ conviction or require him to continue to wait until the state has rendered a final decision regarding his sentence before allowing him to petition for habeas review of the conviction.

BACKGROUND

In 1980, Phillips was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstance, attempted murder, and robbery; he was subsequently sentenced to death. The State of California has bifurcated the process for adjudicating guilt and imposing a death sentence; thus, the death sentence is imposed through an entirely separate trial. In 1985, the Supreme Court of California affirmed Phillips’ conviction but reversed his death sentence. People v. Phillips, 41 Cal.3d 29 , 222 Cal.Rptr. 127 , 711 P.2d 423 (1985). Phillips was not resentenced to death until 1992; the automatic appeal from that sentence has been pending before the state…

Concurring Opinion

Kleinfeld, J.

concurring:

I concur. My analysis differs in two respects, on abstention and on our purporting to make a holding in a case not before us.

The majority concludes that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 , 91 S.Ct. 746 , 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), “is inapplicable,” and analyzes the case in terms of “prudential concerns.” In my view, Younger applies, but contains an equitable exception for eases like this one.

The majority analyzes much of the case in terms of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 , 102 S.Ct. 1198 , 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). This case is not a Rose problem. Rose holds that federal courts should dismiss mixed petitions. This is not a mixed petition. The state does not argue that Phillips has included any claims not exhausted in state court in his petition.

In Younger , the Supreme Court held that federal courts generally may not enjoin ongoing state criminal proceedings, but leaves room for possible exceptions to the general rule for “bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Id. at 54 , 91 S.Ct. at 842 . Younger abstention applies to collateral attacks on convictions as well as petitions for injunctions. See Braden v. 30th Judicial…

Opinion

56 F.3d 1030 Richard Louis Arnold PHILLIPS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Daniel B. VASQUEZ, Warden, San Quentin State Prison, Respondent-Appellee. No. 92-15828. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Oct. 11, 1994. Decided May 26, 1995. Donald Horvath, Fresno, CA, for petitioner-appellant. Edmund D. McMurray, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, CA, for respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Before FLETCHER, REINHARDT, KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge REINHARDT; Concurrence by Judge KLEINFELD. REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 1 It has been almost fifteen years since Richard Louis Arnold Phillips was convicted of murder and first sentenced to death, and ten years since the state supreme court affirmed his conviction and vacated his sentence. The question before us is whether we should now review the constitutionality of Phillips' conviction or require him to continue to wait until the state has rendered a final decision regarding his sentence before allowing him to petition for habeas review of the conviction. BACKGROUND 2 In 1980, Phillips was convicted of first degree murder with special…

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