Meakins
United States v. Meakins
Opinion
Lead Opinion
Haney, J.
The United States appeals from an adverse judgment rendered upon the verdict of a jury in an action brought by appellee under section 19 of the World War Veterans’ Act 1924, as amended, 38 U.S.C.A. § 445 . The claim for disability and death benefits set forth in the complaint is based upon a contract of renewable term insurance issued under section 400 of the Act of September 2, 1914, 38 Stat. 711 , 40 Stat. 409 , and its amendatory acts.
Vern W. Meakins enlisted in the Army May 2, 1918. The insurance policy in question was issued to him on May 4, 1918, in the sum of $10,000. He was honorably discharged February 18, 1919. There was a premium due on the insurance on March 1, 1919, which was not paid, and unless the veteran was totally and permanently disabled on or prior to April 1, 1919, the policy in- question lapsed. The insured died on May 11, 1919.
On June 1, 1919, appellee wrote the following letter, which was received by the *753 Bureau of War Risk Insurance on June 6, 1919:
Appellee received no answer to this letter, which was introduced in evidence over appellant’s objection. Certain other letters were offered in evidence but rejected upon objections sustained, one of…
Dissenting Opinion
Mathews, J.
(dissenting).
Appellee’s letter of June 1, 1919, did not allege permanent and total disability at a time when the contract of insurance was in force, nor did it use words showing an intention to claim insurance benefits. It therefore, did not constitute a “claim,” within the meaning of section 19 of the World War Veterans’ Act, 38 U.S.C.A. § 445 . Compare United States v. Collins, 4 Cir., 61 F.2d 1002 ; United States v. Peters, 8 Cir., 62 F.2d 977 ; Wilson v. United States, 10 Cir., 70 F.2d 176 ; Corn v. United States, 10 Cir., 74 F.2d 438 ; Chavez v. United States, 10 Cir., 74 F.2d 508 ; United States v. Primilton, 5 Cir., 76 F.2d 555 ; United States v. Lockwood, 5 Cir., 81 F.2d 468 ; Werner v. United States, 2 Cir., 86 F.2d 113 . No claim was filed by appellee until March 21, 1933. Meanwhile, on July 3, 1931, the period of limitation specified in section 19 had expired and, having expired, said period was not extended by the filing of appellee’s claim. Her claim was denied on September 24, 1934. This -action was commenced on October 8, 1934. It was and is barred. Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.