Hartley

(concurring).

I concur in the affirmance and agree that appellant’s motion cannot be granted, but I think we have no power to pass on the merits of the latter.

Our jurisdiction in this matter is purely appellate. The only question with which we have authority to deal is the propriety of the order appealed from. It is not contended that the amendment to the statute validated the service already made. In effect, appellant’s motion seeks from this court a declaratory judgment concerning the scope of the statute as amended. We have no power to grant such relief.

If, when the case goes back, service is sought under the amended statute, we may, on appeal from any action taken by the lower court, determine the propriety of such action. We can not, I think, do so in advance.

Appeal has been taken from an order granting a motion to quash service of summons in an action brought by appellant to recover for personal injuries sustained by her in an automobile accident, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellee.

Appellee is a Utah corporation, and was the owner of a Buiclc automobile which was being operated by one Lawler, its vice-president, on September 9, 1936, in Oregon. Lawler and his wife, who was an occupant of the automobile, were both residents of California. The accident occurred on the date mentioned in which there was a collision of appellee’s automobile, driven by Lawler, with an automobile owned and being operated by appellant’s husband while appellant was an occupant therein. Lawler died on December 21, 1936.

On February 3, 1937, appellant filed an action in a state court of Oregon against appellee alleging that the injuries she sustained in the above mentioned accident were caused by appellee’s negligence. Summons was issued, and a copy thereof was served on the Secretary of State of Oregon on February 8, 1937, pursuant to Oregon Code Annotated § 55-402, which provided in part:

“The acceptance by a nonresident of the…