National Labor Relations Board v. Sterling Electric Motors, Inc.
Opinion
Lead Opinion
Denman, J.
This opinion and the foregoing accompanying order arise from the declination of the National Labor Relations Board, for a period of many months, to act under § 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (e), on our commitment to it to take further testimony on a charge against respondent of fraudulent deceit constituting an unfair labor practice. From facts later narrated, the delay appears to be purposed to facilitate the Board in pressing what is, in effect, an ex parte certiorari proceeding in the .Supreme Court to deprive the Sterling Electric Motors company’s Employees’ Association of its right of collective bargaining with respondent, to which we have held the Association is entitled.
The Association had been chosen the bargaining agent of respondent’s employees by a majority of the respondent’s employees and all three of the participating judges agreed that the Association had been organized without employer aid or interference and that a board’s order disestablishing it was not warranted by the evidence. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Sterling Electric Motors, Inc., 9 Cir., 109 F.2d 194, 210 . The court therefore declined to enforce the Board’s…
Dissenting Opinion
Healy, J.
(dissenting).
There have been two decrees in this matter, one entered in January last, the second in May. Each denied enforcement of the Board’s order.
The first decree was ordered vacated following upon the adverse decision in National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350 , 60 S.Ct. 569 , 84 L.Ed. -. However, the original opinion of the court ( 109 F.2d 194 ) was not withdrawn. The same course is pursued now, the second decree being vacated but not the second opinion. 112 F.2d 63 . The opinions stand as the official pronouncement of the court. In them and in the third now handed down the majority continue to elaborate their views with respect to an issue already adversely determined, and which, in any event, in the light of existing Board rules, has long ceased to have any practical importance.
What is the purpose of this novel procedure? If it were the thought to withdraw the decree as improvidently entered and eventually to dispose of the case in harmony with existing decisions of the court of last resort, I would have no objection to the action now taken. But this is far from the aim of my associates. If I correctly read the opinion, a principal…