United States v. Merchants Transfer & Storage Co.

Skinner & Eddy Corporation is the owner and Merchants Transfer & Storage Company the lessee of a warehouse on the Seattle waterfront. The property is situated in the Port of Embarkation, an area largely taken over by the government after the nation’s entry into the war. On July 29, 1943, acting Secretary of War Patterson requested the Attorney General to institute proceedings to condemn this warehouse, and to procure from the court an order for immediate possession pursuant to the Act of March 27, 1942, the Second War Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 631 et seq. In his official letter the Secretary stated that the warehouse was “to be used for the storage of military supplies and for other military purposes and the utmost haste in expediting this project is vital to the successful prosecution of the war.” The estate requested to be condemned was one for a term of years ending June 30, 1944, extendible for yearly periods thereafter during the existing national emergency at the government’s option.

Four days later the United States, through a special assistant to the Attorney General, instituted suit in the court below to condemn the property. The petition recited the various…

(dissenting).

We are all agreed upon the propositions which follow: First, the authority of the executive to take private property by virtue of the war power is not here involved since the Government claims to act under a specific provision of the Second War Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 631 et seq.; second, the determination of the necessity of taking an interest in this particular property made by the Secretary of War under the judicial process proceeding as prescribed by Act of Congress, was a finality, and could not be properly questioned or opposed by the trial court; third, the order of the trial court insofar as it was based upon a denial of the right of the Secretary to determine whether it was necessary and advantageous to take this particular property (see 51 F.Supp. 905 ) was erroneous and constituted an abuse of discretion and, if appealed from, must have been reversed; fourth, the cross appeal should be dismissed; fifth, the order of the court directing the return of the property by the United States, holding the United States in contempt, and laying the basis for assessment of “contempt damages” against the United States is erroneous and must be reversed.

The…