Opinion by Judge SCHROEDER; Dissent by Judge TROTT

Robert Borg, warden of the Folsom State Prison, appeals the district court’s judgment granting California state prisoner Steven Ray Lawson’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his conviction for first degree murder. Borg argues the grant of ha-beas should be reversed because (1) the district court should not have held an evidentia-ry hearing on Lawson’s juror misconduct claim; (2) any claim of juror bias has not been properly exhausted in the state courts; and (3) any juror misconduct resulted in harmless error. We hold the district court committed no error and affirm its judgment granting habeas relief on the ground that, during jury deliberations, one juror committed serious and prejudicial misconduct when he conveyed to other jurors information received out of court about the defendant’s violent reputation.

BACKGROUND

On June 28, 1984, petitioner-appellee Steven Lawson and a friend, Mark Chandler, drove to the home of Marty Avila, who owed Chandler money. Lawson and Chandler brandished guns at Marty and his wife, Charlcia Avila, when they emerged from their home. In the course of the confrontation, Marty Avila shot Chandler. Lawson then shot and killed Marty Avila.

The jury found Lawson guilty of first degree murder and found “true” the special circumstance allegation that he had committed the murder while engaged in an attempted robbery. Cal.Penal Code §§ 187; lQO^aXnXi). 1 The prosecutor had rested its theory of the case on the felony murder rule, arguing that Lawson shot the victim while attempting to rob him. The jury was properly instructed that in order to find the special circumstance that Lawson was attempting robbery, it had to find a specific intent to rob.

Lawson asserted a “claim of right” defense in order to negate any felonious intent to rob. *610 He argued that he had a good faith but mistaken belief in his right to the property sought as payment for the debt to Chandler. The jury deliberated for five days. Two questions posed to the judge during deliberations indicate the difficulty the jury had in deciding the special circumstance issue:

The trial court answered with supplemental instructions that directed the jury to consider the degree of force when it decided the special circumstance issue:

(Emphasis added).

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts: first degree murder with special circumstances, attempted robbery, and two counts of false imprisonment. After a separate penalty phase deliberation, the jury recommended life without parole. Several jurors submitted a note to the trial judge requesting that the court consider the possibility of parole for Lawson, indicating that they did not agree with the penalty choices they felt constrained to make.

In July of 1986, Lawson moved for a new trial based on a claim of juror misconduct. He alleged that juror Scott had made statements during guilt phase deliberations regarding Lawson’s reputation for violence. The motion was accompanied by several sworn declarations from jurors at Lawson’s trial. 2 The state filed a brief in opposition to Lawson’s misconduct claim, submitting supporting declarations from three other jurors, Bentley, Fitzpatrick and Gossett.

The trial court denied the new trial motion as well as the defense’s request for an evi-dentiary hearing. In its written order rejecting Lawson’s claim of juror misconduct, the trial court noted that “[t]he inference raised by affidavits of Jurors Ross, Dahl, and Emery were [sic] refuted by affidavits of Bentley and Fitzpatrick.”

The Third Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal rejected the misconduct claim and affirmed Lawson’s convictions. The court did not reach Lawson’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to call an evidentiary hearing because that issue was pending before the California Supreme Court in People v. Hedgecock, later decided at 51 Cal.3d 395 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 803 , 795 P.2d 1260 (1990). The Third District held, “[assuming arguendo that juror Scott did commit misconduct, we are convinced that no prejudice to defendant resulted.” Lawson’s petition to the California Supreme Court was initially granted but ultimately dismissed, rendering his conviction final.

Following exhaustion of the misconduct claim in the California state courts, Lawson sought habeas in the district court. The magistrate judge ordered an evidentiary hearing on the claim of juror misconduct. In its written Findings and Recommendations, the magistrate judge found that extrajudicial information regarding Lawson’s propensity for violence had been introduced by juror Scott during the guilt phase of jury deliberations. The magistrate judge found that the testimony of the three jurors reporting Scott’s improper statements was more credible than Scott’s denials or the jury foreman’s testimony that such statements had not been made. Although the magistrate judge found *611 that the extraneous information imparted by Scott’s misconduct was “serious and decidedly improper,” he concluded, after noting that the determination was “extremely close,” that the misconduct “did not cause substantial and injurious effect on the outcome.”

On review, the district court found the magistrate judge’s factual findings amply supported by the evidentiary record but the court rejected the finding of no prejudice. The district court accepted the following facts found by the magistrate judge:

Turning to the issue of prejudice, the district court concluded that Scott’s misconduct could not be deemed harmless.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal with this court. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 2253 , and we affirm the district court’s order.

DISCUSSION

I. Propriety of Evidentiary Hearing

The state first contends that the magistrate judge improperly held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct. We reject this argument.

State court factual findings are presumed correct on habeas review unless one of eight exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) applies. One such exception, a finding “that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2), is applicable to the instant case. Here, the trial court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing and resolved the factual issue of alleged juror misconduct solely on the contradictory declarations submitted by the prosecution and defense.

Under the standard announced in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 , 112 S.Ct. 1715 , 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), the magistrate judge properly ordered an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct. “Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habe-as applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.” Id. at 313, 83 S.Ct. at 757 . In light of the content of the allegations and the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering an evidentiary hearing that ultimately established the existence of juror misconduct. See United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir.1993).

II. Exhaustion

The state urges dismissal of Lawson’s ha-beas petition under the “total exhaustion” rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 , 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204 , 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (each claim raised by petitioner must be exhausted before district court may reach the merits of any claim in habeas petition). The state contends that Lawson argued before the district court an unexhausted claim of juror bias independent of his exhausted claim of juror misconduct. The state’s exhaustion theory borders on frivolous.

The district court understood that Lawson sought to “overturn [his] conviction on the single ground that information outside the evidence of record was presented by one of the jurors during deliberations.” Furthermore, the district court’s order made clear that it vacated Lawson’s conviction on a finding that “the extrinsic evidence substantially and injuriously influenced the verdict.”

Although the evidentiary hearing revealed that Scott had lied on voir dire when he denied prior knowledge about Lawson and Lawson’s case, the district court did not grant habeas relief on this ground. The magistrate and district court judges properly considered this dishonesty in assessing the *612 credibility of Scott’s denials that he had engaged in the alleged misconduct during deliberations. The court issued its writ solely on the exhausted claim of Scott’s misconduct in imparting extraneous information to his fellow jurors during deliberations.

III. Prejudice

Jury exposure to facts not in evidence deprives a defendant of the rights to confrontation, cross-examination and assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment. Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.1988); see also Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir.1993) (introduction of extraneous prior bad acts evidence during deliberations constitutes error of constitutional proportions), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1294 , 127 L.Ed.2d 647 (1994). However, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be established that the constitutional error had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, — U.S. -, - & n. 9, 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 1722 & n. 9, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Whether the constitutional error was harmless is not a factual determination entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405 ; Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir.1987). Therefore, we do not defer to the California Third Appellate District’s finding that Lawson suffered no prejudice. We review the district court’s prejudice determination de novo. Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 513 , 130 L.Ed.2d 420 (1994).

Several factors are relevant to determining whether the alleged introduction of extrinsic evidence constitutes reversible error:

Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir.1986), quoted in Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that “none of these factors should be considered dispositive”). 3 When assessing prejudice claims in juror misconduct cases, this court also places great weight on the nature of the extrinsic evidence introduced. See Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1190-91 ; Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406-07 ; Marino, 812 F.2d at 506 .

Here, juror Scott introduced the extrinsic evidence on the second of five days of protracted guilt-phase deliberations, well before a verdict was rendered. See Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1980) (nine hours of deliberation deemed protracted), ce rt. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 , 101 S.Ct. 1749 , 68 L.Ed.2d 231 (1981); see also Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546, 559 (D.C.Cir.1969) (five days protracted).

Furthermore, the extrinsic information directly related to a material issue in the case: intent. See Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1190 ; Dickson, 849 F.2d at 407 . In Lawson’s case, proof of intent to commit robbery was pivotal to establishing the special circumstance of attempted robbery alleged by the prosecution. It is clear from the jury’s questions to the court, in which the jury sought clarification of how use of force should effect a finding of intent to commit robbery, that use of force was the subject of extensive deliberations. In light of the trial court’s response, which linked the “degree of force used” to the determination of intent, any extrinsic evidence of Lawson’s use of force necessarily bore directly on this central question.

This court has observed that “reversible error commonly occurs where there is a direct and rational connection between the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion, and where the misconduct relates di *613 rectly to a material aspect of the case.” Marino, 812 F.2d at 506 (citation omitted). Such a direct connection is present here. The situation is analogous to the circumstances in Dickson , in which a deputy sheriff commented to the jury that the defendant had “done something like this before.” Dickson, 849 F.2d at 407 . Here, as in Dickson , the extrajudicial information “was both directly related to a material issue in the ease and highly inflammatory.” Id.

We reject the state’s alternative arguments that Scott’s misconduct was harmless because the information imparted was either cumulative of properly admitted evidence or rendered insignificant by overwhelming evidence of guilt. Evidence introduced at trial concerning violent acts committed by Lawson was far from conclusive as to Lawson’s intent to rob. 4 Indeed, the jury struggled during deliberations with the question of “how much force can be lawfully used to collect a debt.” Given the materiality of the interrelated issues of intent and use of force, Scott’s statements that petitioner “was very violent” and “had a violent temper” cannot be deemed harmless. See Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1190 (“ ‘The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence.’ ”) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)).

Lastly, our finding of prejudice is not swayed by the state’s contention that not all of the jury members were exposed to the extrajudicial evidence. The number of jurors affected by the misconduct does not weigh heavily in the prejudice calculus for even a single juror’s improperly influenced vote deprives the defendant of an unprejudiced, unanimous verdict. Dickson, 849 F.2d at 408 ; United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 , 98 S.Ct. 58 , 54 L.Ed.2d 74 (1977); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366 , 87 S.Ct. 468, 471 , 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966) (A defendant is “entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors.”).

CONCLUSION

On the facts found by the magistrate judge, we cannot conclude that the juror misconduct was harmless. Given the length of deliberations, the early stage at which the extrinsic information was introduced, our knowledge that the jury was troubled by the issue of intent and its relation to use of force, and the centrality of this issue to the special circumstance constituting first degree murder argued by the prosecution, we hold that the juror misconduct substantially and injuriously influenced the verdict. See Brecht, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 .

The district court’s grant of petitioner’s ■writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED unless the State of California elects to initiate proceedings for a new trial within 45 days.

. Cal.Penal Code § 190.2 provides in relevant part:

Cal.Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(i).

. Juror Ross swore that juror Scott had stated during deliberations “that he had talked to several people who knew Steve Lawson since the case started — about Steve's personality — and they all said that Steve was very violent.” Juror Emory recalled that "[d]uring deliberations on guilt Harlow Scott said that he's heard about Steve Lawson ... around town that Lawson did not have a very good reputation.” Juror Dahl declared, “I recall Harlow Scott ... state[d] to the rest of the jurors that Steve Lawson had a violent temper. Scott said he knew this because he personally had checked on Steve and had gone around town talking to people about Steve.”

The defense also submitted the declaration of its investigator, Barbara Yaley, reporting a conversation with Scott in which Scott allegedly admitted imparting to his fellow jurors information that he had obtained from external sources.

. The bracketed material in factor five reflects the prejudice standard later announced in Brecht , - U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 .

. The evidence at trial showed that Lawson was a cocaine drug trafficker; that prior to going to Avila's house, Lawson got in an argument with his girlfriend's mother and discharged a shotgun into her waterbed; and that he discussed with Chandler the possibility of shooting Marty Avila, the alleged debtor, in the foot to make him comply with their demands for payment. The strongest evidence of Lawson's intent to kill Marty Avila came from Charlcia Avila who testified that Lawson said to Avila on the night of the crime: "I have a contract on you,” "I will blow your head off right now,” and “I’m going to kill you. I have to kill you. I’m going to kill you right now.”

On the other hand, Charlcia admitted on cross-examination that she had given false versions of the events in order to protect herself from prosecution on drug charges. Lawson's own statements to the police after his arrest were introduced and indicated that he said he had gone to the Avilas to help Chandler collect a $150 debt, that he had accompanied Chandler because Chandler was scared of Marty Avila and that Lawson had specifically stated "I wasn’t going to rob this man.”