Carbo

These appeals, consolidated for purposes of hearing and disposition, are from district court orders exonerating appellants’ bail bonds and remanding appellants to the custody of the United States Marshal, denying motions to vacate that order, denying motions to reset bail pending trial, and denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Motions were also made in this court for bail pending appeal. At the hearing on these motions all parties agreed to consider the appeals as submitted on the merits. The motions for bail pending appeal are therefore deemed merged in the appeals on the merits and will not be separately considered.

Under the authority of Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 , 72 S.Ct. 1 , 96 L.Ed. 3 , we have jurisdiction of the appeal from the orders exonerating the bonds and remanding appellants to custody, denying the motions to vacate, and denying the motions to reset bail pending trial.

The motions which led to the entry of these orders and the right to appeal from such orders provide appellants an adequate remedy. The application for a writ of habeas corpus was therefore properly denied as an unnecessary collateral remedy. Stack v. Boyle, supra. The order denying…

(dissenting).

I agree that the opinion of the court ably and correctly sets forth the contentions of the parties and the law as to the inherent power of the court as stated by Justice Harlan in Fernandez v. United States “to revoke bail during the course of a criminal trial, when such action is appropriate to the orderly progress of the trial and the fair administration of justice.” I respectfully disagree, however, with the conclusion reached by my brothers. To me, the representations made to the court, together with his personal observations, were such that I am unable to say that the action of the district judge should be reversed. To quote the further language of Justice Harlan in Fernandez v. United States:

I would affirm.