Schirmer

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Schirmer

Good Law
11 F.3d 1473
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDecember 16, 1993Nos. 91-16580, 91-16601, 92-15688 and 92-15821California3,879 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Fletcher, J.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (“Chevron”) appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of W. Scott Schirmer (“Schirmer”) on Chevron’s suit for specific performance of an option contract to purchase real property. Schirmer appeals the entry of summary judgment for Chevron on his counterclaim for damages sustained from Chevron’s recording of notice of lis pendens on the property. Both sides appeal the denial of their requests for attorneys’ fees. We affirm the summary judgment against Chevron denying specific performance and the denial of its fee request, but reverse the summary judgment against Schirmer on his counterclaim. We also reverse the denial of Schirmer’s fee request, and remand for the determination of reasonable fees.

*1476 I. Facts

In 1987, Schirmer Properties 1 owned a 37.8 acre tract of land in Peoria, Arizona, a small community near Phoenix. On May 14, 1987, the partnership entered into an option contract with Chevron to sell it a 200' x 200' corner parcel of that tract, upon which Chevron intended to build a service station and convenience store. The option provided, in relevant part, that

Chevron failed to exercise the option before it expired.

The record does not…

Concurrence in Part

Reinhardt, J.

concurring and dissenting:

I agree with the majority opinion except for § II.B. In that section, the majority concludes that there is no “minimal, arguable basis” for claiming that Chevron’s underlying action against Sehirmer could have affected *1481 the real property on which it filed a notice of lis pendens. See Maj. Op. at 1479-1480. Accordingly, it holds that Chevron’s notice of lis pendens was “groundless” under Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 33^420. See Maj. Op. at 1479-1480. I respectfully disagree. In light of the record before us, I believe that there is some minimal, arguable basis that Chevron’s underlying action could have affected the real property on which it filed a notice of lis pendens. Accordingly, I would find Chevron’s notice of lis pendens not to be groundless, and I would affirm the district court on that issue.

In my opinion, the majority’s otherwise fine analysis goes astray when it concludes that “[ujnder Arizona’s Statute of Frauds, there is no plausible argument that Sehirmer and Chevron entered into a new, oral option agreement.” Id. (emphasis added). The record clearly shows that a plausible argument exists that Schirmer and Chevron entered into an enforceable…

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