Martel

Opinion by Judge REINHARDT; Dissent by Judge NORRIS.

ORDER

The opinion and dissent filed April 12, 1994, 21 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.1994), are withdrawn. A new opinion and dissent are filed in their place, and the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc is dismissed as moot without prejudice.

OPINION

The district judge in this case is an exceptionally able, hard-working, and conscientious jurist. However, he enforces a procedure widely known as the “rocket docket.” His standard practice is to set cases for trial within three months of the filing of the answer. He adhered to that policy in this § 1983 police brutality action. As a result, the plaintiff, Angel Martel, was forced to go to trial before he had any opportunity to conduct meaningful discovery. Martel appeals from the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendants. Because we conclude that the district judge’s refusal to grant any continuance constituted an abuse of his discretion, and because his enforcement of his “rocket docket” policy violated the Local Rules of the Central District of California, we reverse.

I.

Angel Martel was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic following a brain injury suffered in…

dissenting:

It is the law of our circuit that when a district court denies a continuance sought for the purpose of obtaining additional discovery, the complaining party must show actual and substantial prejudice to obtain a reversal on appeal. 1 See Sablan v. Dep’t of Finance of N. Mariana Islands, 856 F.2d 1317 , 1321 (9th Cir.1988) (a court’s “decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.”) (inner quotation marks omitted); Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investment, Inc., 788 F.2d 535 , 540 (9th Cir.1986); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 , 1285 n. 1 (9th Cir.1977).

While the majority purports to apply this standard, its analysis and conclusions make clear that it considers a denial of “meaningful discovery” to be presumptively prejudicial, regardless of what happens at trial. Majority Opinion at 732. In effect, the majority buys Martel’s argument that the denial of a continuance for the purpose of conducting further discovery was “inherently prejudicial.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11. In holding that…