Dominick Lee Robertson claims the government breached a plea agreement, which contained a waiver of his right to appeal. Because of the breach, Robertson argues he retains the right to appeal. He asks us to vacate his sentence and order the government to comply with the terms of the agreement. Robertson failed to object in district court to the government’s conduct which he now claims is a breach. Because Robertson faded to raise the breach of the plea agreement in district court, we will not consider his claims of breach for the first time on appeal. As a consequence, his waiver of the right to appeal is enforceable. The appeal from the judgment of the district court is therefore dismissed.

FACTS

On August 31, 1992, Robertson pled guilty to obstruction of mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1702 ; use of an unauthorized access device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (a)(2); mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 ; laundering monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S:C. § 1966(a)(1)(B)©; engaging in monetary transactions in unlawfully derived property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a); theft of mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 ; and failure to appear, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146 . The pleas were entered pursuant to a written plea agreement that contained a clause waiving Robertson’s right to appeal:

Paragraph 3 of the plea agreement provided:

At sentencing, the prosecutor argued against an acceptance of responsibility reduction because Robertson had “been less than truthful with Probation.” The prosecutor based this assertion on Robertson’s failure to disclose an arrest in Arizona during the time he was evading authorities in California. However, probation only asked Robertson about convictions; it never asked Robertson about arrests.

Robertson was sentenced to 48 months in custody on the six fraud-related counts and to a consecutive 12-month sentence on the failure to appear count. The court also imposed a special assessment, a substantial fine, and ordered restitution in the amount of nearly a quarter of a million dollars.

Robertson timely appealed. The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on Robertson’s waiver of his right to appeal. A motions panel denied the government’s motion to dismiss.

ANALYSIS

A merits panel of this court may review the motions panel’s decision. Hard v. *1048 Burlington N.R.R., 870 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir.1989) (“law of the case” doctrine does not preclude merits panel from reviewing motions panel’s denial of motion to dismiss). “This court reviews the waiver of a statutory right to appeal de novo.” United States v. Gonzalez, 16 F.3d 985, 988 (9th Cir.1994). Robertson argues that the government breached his plea agreement, thereby releasing him from the terms of that agreement including the waiver of his right to appeal. The government argues that Robertson may not contend on appeal that the government breached the plea agreement because he failed to call the alleged breach to the attention of the district court. Robertson counters that he adequately objected to the alleged breach by stating at the sentencing hearing, “[n]ow, acceptance of responsibility is where we differ.” That statement was not treated as an objection by either party or the district court. Near the end of the sentencing. hearing the following colloquy occurred:

We find that Robertson did not raise the alleged breach of the plea agreement in the district court.

Issues not presented to the district court cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1012 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 , 104 S.Ct. 1593 , 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984).

United States v. Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir.1991).

The court, in Flores-Payon , recognized certain narrow exceptions to the general rule against review on appeal of issues not raised at the district court:

Id. at 558 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir.1990)).

Robertson argues that “exceptional circumstances” except him from the general rule. The circumstances Robertson relies on are: (1) the sentencing hearing was very confusing to all parties because the proceedings jumped from one issue to the next without affording closure of several issues, and the district court “jumped in and made its sentencing ruling at a time when an average attorney could not have had the focus to formally object”; and (2) Robertson’s attorney could not be expected to anticipate the government’s argument against a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. These circumstances are not “exceptional.”

Our holding in Gonzalez is not to the contrary. In Gonzalez the defendant did not *1049 appeal the government’s breach of a plea agreement. 16 F.3d at 989 . Instead, the defendant argued that as a matter of law he was entitled to a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. at 989 . The defendant had raised that issue before the district court. Id. at 990 . Robertson does not argue that he is entitled to a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility as a matter of law. Instead, he asks this court to remand his case for resentencing and order the government to comply with the plea agreement. As we noted in Gonzalez , “[the defendant’s] failure to raise the breach of [the plea agreement] in district court would prevent him from arguing here that he is entitled to a remedy for the breach, such as being resentenced without the government opposing the acceptance of responsibility adjustment.” Id. at 989 . Because Robertson failed to raise the breach of the plea agreement in district court, we will not consider his claims of breach for the first time on appeal. Consequently, his waiver of the right to appeal is enforceable. 1

Robertson’s appeal from the judgment of the district court is dismissed.

. Because Robertson validly waived his right to appeal, we do not reach the rest of his arguments, including his alleged Rule 32 violation and his argument that consecutive sentences were improperly imposed.