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*1090 ORDER

The Order filed on April 16, 1997 is withdrawn. The panel will redesignate that same Order as being “FOR PUBLICATION” and will file it.

ORDER

A majority of the panel as constituted above has voted to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion for rehearing en bane.

The full court was advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc. An active judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of votes in favor of en banc consideration. Fed.R.App.P. 35.

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.

A district court may award the prevailing party in a civil rights action “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988 . A “reasonable fee” is “reasonable compensation,” usually a reasonable rate multiplied by a reasonable number of hours. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 , 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). It is not meant to be a “windfall,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 , 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548 , 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), nor is it “economic relief to improve the financial lot of lawyers,” City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-63 , 112 S.Ct. 2638, 2642, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992).

This case called upon the district court to decide whether Guam’s ban on abortions was unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade-not exactly rocket science. The district judge considered it “the easiest issue that [he’d] ever been confronted with.” Plaintiffs’ counsel nevertheless claimed that 1,487 billable hours were reasonably necessary to secure this judicial breakthrough. Surprisingly, the district judge agreed, and awarded counsel $175 for each one of those 1,487 hours. Our divided court affirmed the award, citing statements of Guam attorneys that $175 per hour or more was…

concurring in the order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing en bane:

The Court rejected the en banc suggestion in this matter and for good reason. The appeal concerned the issue of attorney’s fees: a matter particularly within the discretion of the district court that heard the case from start to finish. It is not surprising that 1,487 hours were approved by the district court, for some 97% of them were not contested by the opposing parties. The application of the multiplier also brought the hourly rates to a level for which there was ample support in the record. And while some may feel the ease did not involve “rocket science,” it is well to remember that the underlying litigation occurred after Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 , 109 S.Ct. 3040 , 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989), but before Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). Thus, the plaintiffs undertaking the case had to approach it, in terms of building an adequate factual record, as if it might well be the vehicle for overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Finally, the “easiest issue ever confronted” comment by the district…