United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency

Opinion by Judge T.G. NELSON; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge REINHARDT.

This case of civil forfeiture has returned to us on remand from the Supreme Court after the Court, in United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), reversed our holding in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994), that the forfeiture violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We now consider the claimants’ remaining arguments challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States in the Government’s forfeiture action under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 12, 1991, Charles Arlt, James Wren, and others were indicted on multiple federal criminal charges, including charges relating to the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine and money laundering. On June 17,1991, the Government instituted this civil forfeiture action. The property listed in the forfeiture complaint consisted of the following items:

The Government argued that this property was connected to the…

concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the majority’s excellent analysis of the probable cause issue and, indeed, in all of the opinion except for its last two sentences. I dissent only from the majority’s failure to consider the claimants’ argument that the forfeiture violated the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.

When one issue is dispositive of an appeal, it is not necessary to reach alternative arguments that might be equally dispositive. That is the rule that the majority purports to apply. In this ease, however, while the result the majority reaches is to order a remand for further examination of the probable cause question on the basis of additional evidence to be introduced by the government, the issue it refuses to decide has the potential for ending the litigation now. Where such a potential exists, it is unfair to the parties and a waste of judicial resources to order a remand for further district court proceedings that may subsequently result in an unnecessary and time-consuming second appeal.

Here, if we were to rule for the claimants on the merits of their Eighth Amendment argument, the matter would be ended. True, we might rule against them or might…