John Papai, Joanna Papai v. Harbor Tug and Barge Company

67 F.3d 203 1995 A.M.C. 2888 , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7465 , 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12 ,807 John PAPAI, Joanna Papai, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARBOR TUG AND BARGE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. No. 93-15132. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted May 9, 1994. Decided Sept. 25, 1995. 1 Thomas J. Boyle, Law Offices of Thomas J. Boyle, San Francisco, CA, for plaintiffs-appellants. 2 Eric Danoff, Graham & James, San Francisco, CA, for defendant-appellee. 3 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. 4 Before: POOLE and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and TAKASUGI, 1 District Judge. 5 Opinion by Judge TAKASUGI; Dissent by Judge POOLE. TAKASUGI, District Judge: 6 This case arises from a knee injury sustained by plaintiff John Papai while in the course and scope of his employment for defendant Harbor Tug and Barge Company on board the tug Point Barrow. Plaintiff appeals the granting of a partial summary judgment and a subsequent judgment for the defendant after a court trial. Because we hold that summary judgment was granted in error, we do not reach plaintiff's challenge to the court's findings made at trial. This…

Opinion by Judge TAKASUGI; Dissent by Judge POOLE.

This ease arises from a knee injury sustained by plaintiff John Papal while in the course and scope of his employment for defendant Harbor Tug and Barge Company on board the tug Point Barrow. Plaintiff appeals the granting of a partial summary judgment and a subsequent judgment for the defendant after a court trial. Because we hold that summary judgment was granted in error, we do not reach plaintiffs challenge to the court’s findings made at trial.

This appeal raises two issues:

1. What factors are relevant to the determination of seaman status under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.CApp. §§ 688, et seq., in terms of the requirement that the claimant have a substantial connection with the vessel; and

2. Whether plaintiffs receipt of compensation benefits under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) precludes him from also recovering as a seaman under the Jones Act.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Plaintiff worked at various maritime related jobs for various companies and obtained his maritime jobs through the hiring hall of the Inland Boatman’s Union of the Pacific (“IBU”). He was not a permanent employee of…

dissenting:

Because I cannot agree with my colleagues’ construction of Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2172 , 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995), as it applies to this case, I respectfully dissent.

This case hinges on the construction of the “connection to a vessel” requirement for defining seamen under the Jones Act. We are blessed to have as an aid a recent Delphic pronouncement, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chandris. As the majority reads Chandris, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether plaintiffs relationship with a vessel (or group of vessels) was substantial in terms of duration and nature, which requires consideration of the total circumstances of his employment.” See supra at 206. So far, so good. We agree over what relationship a seaman must have — a relationship substantial in both duration and nature.

But with what must a seaman have that relationship? It is here I believe my colleagues have sailed off course. Relying on Chandris, the majority concludes that “it may be necessary to examine the work performed by the employee while employed by different employers during the relevant time period.” See supra at 206. In one stroke, perhaps without even fully realizing it,…