dissenting:

Under 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (a), Brockamp’s claim for a refund of her father’s 1983 taxes was untimely. See Miller v. United States, 38 F.3d 473, 475 (9th Cir.1994). Brockamp argues that even so the doctrine of equitable tolling should operate to relieve her from the time limitations of § 6511. 1

The Supreme Court has held that “the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.” Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 , 111 S.Ct. 453, 457 , 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (Title VII action). At the same time, the Court has recognized that equitable tolling is traditionally extended only “sparingly,” in two limited circumstances not at issue here. 2 Id. at 96 , 111 S.Ct. at 457-58 ; see also Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267-68 (9th Cir.) (noting that equitable tolling is available in “extreme cases” and has been, applied “sparingly”), cer t. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 196 , 121 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992).

Sparing or not, the principles of equitable tolling cannot be applied to § 6511. In Unit *264 ed States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 , 110 S.Ct. 1361 , 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), decided nine months before Irwin , the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of equitable recoupment could not be applied to toll § 6511. The Court was not willing to allow that equitable doctrine to, in effect, extend the time that a taxpayer would have to apply for a refund of taxes. It approvingly pointed out that in the earlier case of Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 , 55 S.Ct. 695, 699 , 79 L.Ed. 1421 (1935), it had made it clear that even reliance on an inconsistent assessment by the Commissioner would not serve to “toll the statute of limitations.” 494 U.S. at 607 , 110 S.Ct. at 1367 . If the equitable recoupment principle was to apply at all, it had to be on a ground other than tolling.

The Court’s holding applies with equal force to the present attempt to toll the statute of limitations on equitable grounds. Here, as there, the jurisdictional bar of § 6511 would have to be lifted. See id. at 608, 110 S.Ct. at 1368 . As the Court said, “unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been ‘erroneously,’ ‘illegally,’ or ‘wrongfully collected,’ may not be maintained in any court.” Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. at 1365 (citations omitted). Moreover, Dalm was an appealing taxpayer. She had not failed to pay her taxes or to file a return. But she was going to be required to pay twice. That was after the government had even assessed penalties and interest with respect to the gift taxes that it nearly conceded need not have been paid at all because what it really wanted was income taxes for the transaction. As the dissent said, the Court, in effect, held that the statute of limitations could not be tolled “by Government conduct that [the] Court [had] censured as ‘immoral’ and tantamount to ‘a fraud on the taxpayer’s rights.’ ” Id. at 612 , 110 S.Ct. at 1370 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Kolom v. United States, 791 F.2d 762, 768 (9th Cir.1986).

Thus, although Irwin creates a rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling in most areas, Dalm effectively rebuts that presumption because in it the Supreme Court determined that principles of equity would not be applied to toll § 6511. Other courts have recognized that. See, e.g., Vintilla v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444 , 1446-47 & n. 1 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that, together, Irwin and Dalm , bar equitable tolling of § 6511(a)); Webb v. United States, 850 F.Supp. 489, 491-93 (E.D.Va.1994) (invoking Dalm and Irwin to hold that equitable tolling is inapplicable in tax refund cases). 3

A different approach was taken in Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.1993) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 705 , 126 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994). The First Circuit held that the provisions of § 6511 cannot be equitably tolled, but it arrived at that conclusion by analogizing § 6511 to the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at issue in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 , 111 S.Ct. 2773 , 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991). Even though under Irwin a rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applied, the Court in Lampf held that the structure of the statutes at issue made clear that Congress intended to foreclose resort to equity to stretch the statutes’ time limitations. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363-64 , 111 S.Ct. at 2782 .

In Oropallo , the First Circuit rested upon an analogy to Lampf instead of an analysis of Dalm because it believed that Irwin had “changed [the Supreme Court’s] approach to the issue of equitable tolling in suits against the government” from what it had been at the time of Dalm, 994 F.2d at 29 . Lampf according to Oropallo , “altered” “the relevant analysis” yet again. Id.

However, given that the three cases were decided within thirteen months of each other, I believe that they should be read together if they can be reconciled. 4 Lampf expressly *265 recognizes the rebuttable presumption principle of Irwin but holds that “the equitable tolling doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent” with the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act at issue. 501 U.S. at 363 , 111 S.Ct. at 2782. Thus, Lampf and Irwin are compatible. Likewise, Lampf, Irwin and Dalm can be reconciled. Although Dalm does not use rebuttable presumption language, it recognizes, as was the case with the statutes in Lampf and their raison d’etre, that equitable tolling principles are inconsistent with the foundational underpinnings of the Internal Revenue Code. See Webb, 850 F.Supp. at 492 (applying Dalm broadly). That is because tax laws are “technical laws which are not subject to general principles of equity.” Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 28 n. 3 (citing Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237, 249 , 75 S.Ct. 736, 744 , 99 L.Ed. 1029 (1955), and Ewing v. United States, 914 F.2d 499, 501 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 905 , 111 S.Ct. 1683 , 114 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991)).

Finally, when Congress has included specific exceptions in a statute of limitations, we should not readily read additional ones into it. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (holding [pre- Irwin] that equitable tolling cannot apply to the Fair Credit Reporting Act because Congress explicitly delineated certain exceptions to its statute of limitations, equitable tolling not among them); cf. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 610 , 110 S.Ct. at 1369 ; Parks Sch. of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). Section 6511(c) contains an exception to the limitations period for those who negotiate an agreement for an extension of time with the IRS. Moreover, §§ 1311-1314 contain certain narrow “mitigation provisions” that extend the limitations period in some circumstances. Because Congress has specifically provided exceptions to the time requirements of subsections 6511(a) and (b), we should be chary of reading others into them, including equitable tolling.

In short, because, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Dalm , equitable principles are inconsistent with the statutory scheme of the Internal Revenue Code, I need not resort to a Lampf-style analysis in order to conclude that the district court should be affirmed. Nonetheless, Oropallo’s elucidation of § 6511 compared with the statutes at issue in Lampf does provide further support for my conclusion.

As Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 27 , pointed out, in addition to the limitations periods imposed by § 6511(a), subsection (b) of § 6511 places limits on the amount of any refund a claimant may receive. Under § 6511(b)’s provisions, Broekamp would not be able to collect any refund even if her suit were allowed to go forward under subsection (a) because the gap between the time that her father made the payments to the IRS and the time that she filed the refund claim is too great.

Broekamp argues, however, that equitable tolling should also be applied to § 6511(b), which would then allow her to collect the full amount of the refund that she claims she is owed. Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 30 , likened the interaction of subsections 6511(a) and (b) to the “l-and-3-year-strueture” of the provisions at issue in Lampf, which required that an action under the Securities Exchange Act be brought within one year after the discovery of facts constituting the cause of action and in no event later than three years after the accrual of the cause of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (e). The three-year provision in Lampf was found by the Court to be “a period of repose inconsistent with tolling.” 501 U.S. at 363 , 111 S.Ct. at 2782. As Oro-pallo recognized, the provisions of § 6511(b) also operate as a period of repose and impose an outside limit on recovery. See generally Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 28-31 . The provisions of § 6511(b) were intended by Congress “to prevent a taxpayer from extending the time for filing a claim for the entire tax by making small payments from time to time.” *266 Snyder v. United States, 616 F.2d 1187, 1188 (10th Cir.1980) (emphasis added) (citing S.Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1924)). In other words, even though the subsection “clearly operates like a statute of limitations,” it more clearly imposes a period of repose so that the government may finally have closure as to particular tax returns. Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 30 n. 7. I cannot say it better than the Court did in Rothensies v. Electric Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 , 67 S.Ct. 271, 273 , 91 L.Ed. 296 (1946):

Broekamp presents the appealing argument that her aged father mistakenly remitted way too much money when he applied for an extension of time to file his income tax return for 1983. Basically, she argues that it is unfair to apply the statute of limitations to her. It is true that every statute of limitations has at least a tinge of unfairness because it can preclude the collection of past debts and the assertion of just claims against a person who should give the plaintiff recompense. That is why in a somewhat gentler era than ours Hoffman wrote, “I will never plead the Statute of Limitations when based on the mere efflux of time; for if my client is conscious that he owes the debt, and has no other defense than the legal bar, he shall never make me a partner in his knavery.” 2 David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 751 Resolution XII (2d ed. 1836). Thus, I am not unsympathetic.

However, in the Internal Revenue Code Congress has attempted to create a tesselat-ed scheme which assures that the government will receive needed revenues and that those receipts can, after a time, be counted upon as it supplies services to the nation. Considering the complexity of the design, perfection cannot be expected. Considering the vast extent of the design and the numbers of people affected by it, the special thoughts, intentions, needs, and circumstances of each taxpayer cannot always be accommodated. So it is here.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. Another serious issue lurks in this case. Brockamp asserts that the amount paid to the government was a "deposit" rather than a "payment.” Because the issue is not addressed by the majority and need not be, there is no reason for me to spill ink over it.

. Those circumstances are “where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Id. at 96, 111 S.Ct. at 458 (footnotes omitted).

. But see First Interstate Bank v. United States, 874 F.Supp. 286 (D.Nev.1994) (appeal pending); Wiltgen v. United States, 813 F.Supp. 1387 (N.D.Iowa 1992); Johnsen v. United States, 758 F.Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y.1991), in which the courts held that under Irwin , equitable tolling applies to § 6511(a).

. The view that Irwin and Dalm complement each other — as opposed to the assumption in Oropallo that Irwin superseded Dalm — is also *265 supported by the fact that in Dalm , Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, White, Black-mun, O'Connor, and Scalia were in the majority, while Justices Stevens, Marshall and Brennan dissented. In Irwin , Justice Marshall joined the majority (in a concurrence), Justice Stevens again dissented, and Justice Souter, who had replaced Justice Brennan, did not take part in the decision. For Irwin to truly have been intended to render Dalm obsolete (an unlikely proposition particularly given that Irwin makes no mention of Dalm), six justices would have had to have changed their positions in the space of nine months.