Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc.

Opinion by Judge WRIGHT; Dissent by Judge PREGERSON.

In this complex antitrust case we must decide, among other issues, whether the district court erred in submitting to the jury the plaintiffs’ Clayton Act § 3 exclusive dealing and other state law claims.

I

Background

Manufacturers of petroleum dispensing equipment 1 sell their products, both directly and through authorized distributors, to the owners of retail gasoline outlets, including major oil companies, independent business persons (“jobbers”), national and regional convenience store chains, and independent regional oil companies. Five manufacturersGilbarco, Dresser Wayne, Tokheim, Schlumberger, and Bennett-currently compete for these sales in the United States.

Larger customers, such as the major oil companies and national convenience store chains, generally purchase their dispensers directly from the manufacturers through annually negotiated contracts. Major oil companies often negotiate prices for their affiliated jobbers, but the jobbers are not required to purchase their dispensers from their major oil company’s principal supplier. Smaller customers typically purchase their dispensers from the approximately 500…

dissenting:

I dissent from the part of the majority’s opinion that holds that the district court erred in denying Gilbareo’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Clayton Act § 3 claim. The district court properly instructed the jury. Substantial evidence in the record supports the jury’s verdict. In holding to the contrary, the majority misapplies the proper standard of review and misconstrues Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent in articulating the elements of a Clayton Act § 3 claim.

The standard for reviewing a jury verdict is whether the jury verdict is supported by “substantial evidence,” that is, such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Murray v. Laborers Union Local No. 324, 55 F.3d 1445, 1452 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1847 , 134 L.Ed.2d 948 (1996); see also Erickson v. Pierce County, 960 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir.1992) (“Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, are reviewed de novo to determine if the plaintiffs claims were supported by substantial evidence.”). The credibility of the witnesses and the weight…