Jones

OVERVIEW

A former state legislator and several of his constituents filed this action, contending the lifetime term limits in California’s Proposition 140 violate their federal constitutional rights. After a trial, the district court agreed and enjoined the Proposition’s enforcement. The district court stayed its injunction pending appeal.

A divided three-judge panel of this court affirmed the district court. A majority of the active judges of the full court then voted to rehear the case en banc and, to accommodate the parties’ interests, we agreed to rehear the case on an expedited basis. We have done so and we now reverse the district court.

FACTS

The facts are set forth in detail in the panel’s opinion, see Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.1997). We summarize them briefly.

*845 In 1990, California voters approved Proposition 140, an initiative which imposed specific lifetime term limits for state legislators and certain state officers. The Proposition limited state senators to two terms, state assembly members to three terms, and the state governor to two terms. Cal. Const, art. IV, § 2(a); art. V, § 2. The Proposition also limited to two terms the Lieutenant Governor,…

concurring in the result:

I concur in the result reached by Judge Thompson for the court and, except for a threshold concern, I would agree with his sound analysis of the merits. I also join in Judge Rymer’s thoughtful discussion of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and her analysis of res judicata. ■ I write separately for two reasons: first, to suggest the utter absence of a federal question — irrespective of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or res judicata— and hence an additional ground for our lack of.jurisdiction to hear the case at all; and second, to respond to Judge Fletcher’s dissent in which she urges that Proposition 140 is constitutionally infirm for lack of adequate “notice” to California voters.

I

I have grave doubt that our court has jurisdiction to review this case, irrespective of Judge Rymer’s concurring opinion or Judge Schroeder’s dissent. There is compelling authority that a state’s adoption of term limits on its own government’s elected offi *848 cials fails to raise a substantial federal question.

In Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 , 96 S.Ct. 1689 , 48 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976), the Supreme Court las', had the opportunity to rule on term limits ior state officials and…

Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part:

The majority today decides questions of great importance: May a State, consistent with the Constitution, impose a lifetime term limitation upon elected officials for state office, and, if so, how may the State go about enacting such a restriction? These are questions of first impression among the federal courts of appeal. With regret, I must conclude that the majority has not given them the careful consideration that they deserve.

I.

The State of California argues, as do Judge Rymer and Judge Schroeder, that the question of the constitutionality of Proposition 140 is res judicata as between the parties to this action, and that we should not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. It is, of course, well established that federal courts must give full faith and credit to a valid judgment rendered by a state court of competent jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 . More precisely, a federal court must accord such a judgment the same preclusive effect that it would receive in the rendering state. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 873, 877 , 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996). California and Judges Rymer and Schroeder…

concurring in the result:

I agree with Judge Thompson’s disposition of Bates’s appeal, assuming the merits are reached and that an Anderson /Burdick balancing test is required. However, I write separately for two reasons: First, to explain why I believe that the district court should not have entertained this action because it involves the same claim by related parties already considered and decided by the California Supreme Court. In effect, we are asked to review the state supreme court’s opinion that Proposition 140 is constitutional — but that’s not our right to do. Only the United States Supreme Court can overturn a decision by the highest court of a state. For a federal district court to make an independent determination of constitutionality in the face of a final state court adjudication on the same point implicates well-settled doctrines of finality, federalism, and the limits of appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, in my view, the district court lacked the authority to proceed; and in any event, should have declined to do so on grounds of res judicata.

Second, assuming that we have jurisdiction, I write separately to suggest that the state’s interest in Proposition 140 is…

concurring:

I join the majority opinion because, although I believe there are responsible arguments to be made on both sides, I do not believe the Constitution of the United States restrains citizens of a state from imposing *860 term limits, even a lifetime ban on future service, on their elected state representatives. Our role here, of course, is to judge not the wisdom of such a measure, but its constitutionality.

I also write separately to express briefly two other points that deserve mention.

First, while I agree with the majority in its res judicata analysis, I would go further than the majority. Not only does the public interest exception enable us to review this matter, but even if the exception did not apply, this ease would not be barred by res judicata because the parties in this case are not in complete privity with those in Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 283 , 816 P.2d 1309 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 1292 , 117 L.Ed.2d 516 (1992).

The interests of Bates (and the other named plaintiffs) could not have been adequately represented by the Legislature or the particular legislators in Eu. Bates et al. assert their own individual…

dissenting in part:

I agree that the district court must be reversed and the injunction vacated. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that we should reach the merits of the constitutional controversy. The California Supreme Court has already decided it. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 283 , 816 P.2d 1309 (1991). The majority correctly recognizes that res judicata would ordinarily bar relitigation of such issues, but incorrectly concludes that the California Supreme Court would apply a “public interest” exception to permit relitigation.

Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, we must give the state court judgment the same preclusive effect that the California Supreme Court would afford it. U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ; Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 , 104 S.Ct. 892 , 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). There is nothing in California law to suggest the California Supreme Court would decide to revisit the same case it decided a few years ago, particularly when no intervening federal cases would compel it to change its analysis.

The majority cites Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 11 Cal.4th 607 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108,…