Neztsosie

El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie

Caution
136 F.3d 610·1998 WL 52032
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitFebruary 11, 1998Nos. 96-17121, 96-17139California6,038 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Pregerson, J.

Members of the Navajo Nation (the “Navajo Court Plaintiffs”) filed two separate actions in Navajo Tribal Court against corporations that conducted uranium mining operations on the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Navajo Court Plaintiffs alleged personal injury and wrongful death claims based on Navajo common law. In response to those actions, El Paso Natural Gas Company (“El Paso”) and Cyprus Foote Mineral Company and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company (collectively “Cyprus”) filed two separate suits in federal district court seeking preliminary injunctions to enjoin the Navajo Tribal Court from asserting jurisdiction over the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ claims. El Paso and Cyprus (collectively the “mining companies”) alleged that all actions arising from “nuclear incidents” fall within the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., and must be litigated in federal court.

The district court granted in part, and denied in part, the mining companies’ requests for preliminary injunctions. The district court granted the preliminary injunctions to the extent the Navajo Court Plaintiffs alleged claims under Price-Anderson. The district court denied the preliminary injunctions, however, to the…

Dissenting Opinion

Kleinfeld, J.

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

In these two lawsuits, three Navajo Indians sued El Paso Natural Gas Company, a Delaware corporation, and Cyprus Foote Mineral Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, in Navajo tribal court. The Richards ease alleged death from cancer caused by radiation. The Neztsosies’ case alleged that the Neztsosies and their cattle were poisoned by drinking water contaminated with radiation and heavy metals. The uranium mining occurred many years ago. In ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction, the district court ruled that tribal court proceedings were enjoined as to Price-Anderson claims, but not as to other claims, and did not rule on whether the Price-Anderson Act applied to claims asserted by plaintiffs in tribal court. Plaintiffs did not appeal the injunction against litigating Price-Anderson claims in tribal court, so it should be treated as law of the case. The corporations appealed denial of the preliminary injunction as to all claims not covered by Price-Anderson. The majority opinion lets the plaintiffs sue the corporations in tribal court on all their claims, Price-Anderson or not. That is incorrect.

The Price-Anderson Act, as originally…

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