Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.

We must decide whether a distributor and downstream purchaser of vintage automobile tires has standing to bring an antitrust action under the Clayton Act against a competitor and supplier for damages and divestiture.

I

Coker Tire Company, Inc. (“Coker Tire”) and Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. (“Lucas Automotive”) sell vintage automobile tires to customers worldwide. Vintage tires are different from tires used on modern automobiles in terms of their size, dimensions, structure, design and manufacturing. They are replicas of the tires which originally were sold on vintage, antique and collector cars, and are no longer made for use on modern cars. Vintage tires are typically bias ply tires, whereas modern automobile tires are radial construction. Vintage tires are distributed through specialty tire channels of distribution.

Lucas alleges that the relevant market for purposes of this action is limited to original equipment (“OE”) major brand vintage tires. These tires bear the trademarks of tires which originally were sold on vintage cars. For American cars, the OE major brands in vintage tires are Firestone, B.F. Goodrich, U.S. Royal and Goodyear. Coker Tire is the exclusive…

with whom WHALEY, District Judge, concurs:

The district court, without distinguishing Lucas Automotive’s equitable claim from its treble damage claim, granted Coker Tire summary judgment on both claims because “Lucas has not produced any evidence to show that Coker has in fact raised these prices [on brand name vintage tires]. Therefore, it has not suffered any actual injury.” Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 8 (Oct. 17, 1995) (citing Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir.1995)). It further held that “Lucas also lacks standing to bring this claim because it has not actually purchased tires from Coker. Lucas does not buy its Firestone vintage tires directly from Coker.” Citing Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720 , 97 S.Ct. 2061 , 52 L.Ed.2d 707 , the district court held that “Lucas must buy directly from Coker to have standing to sue for any price increases Coker puts into effect as a result of its alleged monopoly.” The district court concluded the portion of its opinion on antitrust standing: “The Court therefore finds that Lucas has not suffered an antitrust injury because its losses are not due to any anti-competitive acts by Coker.…

dissenting only as to Part II.B.2.

I respectfully dissent from Part II.B.2 of the opinion, written by Judge Tashima.

The majority holds that Lucas Automotive has consumer standing to assert a section 7 claim for equitable relief, including divestiture, under section 16 of the Clayton Act. However, our decision in Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir.1995), viewed in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 , 107 S.Ct. 484 , 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986), compels the opposite conclusion.

As the Supreme Court held in Cargill, in order to establish antitrust standing to sue for divestiture under section 16 of the Clayton Act, a plaintiff is required to “allege threatened loss or damage ‘of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.’ ” Cargill, 479 U.S. at 113 , 107 S.Ct. at 491 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 , 97 S.Ct. 690, 697-98 , 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977)). The majority concludes that, as a purchaser of tires at the subdistributor level, Lucas Automotive is threatened with antitrust…