Vannatta

Vannatta v. Keisling

Good Law
151 F.3d 1215·1998 WL 461920
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitAugust 11, 1998Nos. 95-35998, 95-35999California5,384 words

Opinion

Concurrence in Part

Brunetti, J.

concurring in part and dissenting:

The state of Oregon amended its constitution to prohibit state candidates from using or directing any contributions from out-of-district residents and to penalize candidates when more than 10% of their total “funding” comes from such individuals. The amendment was challenged under several provisions of the constitution and was struck down, in a summary judgment order, by the district court under the First Amendment. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellants, we review the award of summary judgment de novo, Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995).

I.

In November of 1994, the voters of Oregon amended their constitution by passing Ballot Measure 6 (“Measure 6”). Measure 6 provided:

SECTION 4. A violation of Section (3) shall be an unclassified felony.

Although Measure 6 does not expressly limit its application to state races, it amends Article II of the state constitution which governs state elections. The parties do not argue Measure 6 applies to federal elections and to the extent it attempted to do so, it would be preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act.

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment…

Dissenting Opinion

Brunetti, J.

dissenting:

At this point I must part with Judge Ferguson and Judge King with regal'd to the appellant’s portrayal of the state’s interest not so much as preventing corruption but as presenting a distortion of the state’s republican form of government. The majority opinion rejects this argument, however, I conclude that Oregon has a sufficiently important interest in protecting its republican form of government and I dissent from the affirmance of the district court.

Appellant argues that Measure 6 advances this interest by preventing those who are ineligible to vote from influencing the outcome of elections. We can consider any interest which Measure 6 serves in assessing the constitutionality of the provision. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 , 103 S.Ct. 2875 , 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983).

In several cases the Supreme Court has emphasized the right of states and cities to reserve their political processes and resources for their own residents. In Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70 , 99 S.Ct. 383 , 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978), the Court upheld Alabama legislation that extended police and other city powers over non-residents living within three…

Lead Opinion

Ferguson, J.

Opinion by Judge FERGUSON; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge BRUNETTI.

I.

We adopt as the unanimous opinion of this panel all of Judge Brunetti’s concurring opinion set forth in parts I, II, and III. We also adopt Part IV(A), which declares that Measure 6 is not closely drawn to advance the goal of preventing corruption and fails to pass muster under the First Amendment.

II.

We reject Judge Brunetti’s argument in dissent, Parts IV(B) and V, that Measure 6 is valid because it prevents a distortion of the republican form of government in the State of Oregon. It could be argued that the initiative process itself distorts the republican form of government.

III.

Measure 6 was on the Oregon Ballot with Measure 9. That Measure was a set of statutes also adopted by the initiative process. The Oregon Supreme Court in Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or. 514 , 931 P.2d 770 (1997) held that the statutes in Measure 9 which, *1217 like Measure 6, limited or banned campaign contributions, violated the Free Speech provisions of the State Constitution. One matter that is common in both Measures is the limitation upon candidates using campaign contributions from individuals who…

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