Emard
Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co.
Opinion
Concurrence in Part
Hall, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that ERISA would not prevent imposition of a constructive trust in the circumstances of this case. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with its treatment of California’s law of community property. Because the application of community property law would require the ERISA plan administrator to distribute the proceeds of Ginger’s life insurance policy to someone other than the named beneficiary, ERISA preemption should apply.
The preemption question raised in this case has implications well beyond the community property context. It is not infrequently alleged, for instance, that beneficiary designations under ERISA welfare plans are altered by state laws governing domestic relations, wills, trusts, or estates. In almost every such case, our sister circuits have held that ERISA preempts state law. See, e.g., Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794 , 796 n. 2, 809 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1799 , 140 L.Ed.2d 939 (1998); Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1325 (5th Cir.1994); Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 15 (2nd Cir.1993); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.…
Lead Opinion
Beezer, J.
Opinion by Judge BEEZER; 'Partial' Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL.
Gary Emard (“Emard”) filed an action in California state court seeking a declaration that, under California law, he is entitled to at least half of the proceeds of two term insurance policies insuring the life of his deceased wife, Ginger Emard (“Ginger”). The policies were issued as an employee benefit under *952 the Hughes Aircraft Company plan, which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 . The action was removed to district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 . The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alex Stencel (“Stencel”), Ginger’s former husband and the designated policy beneficiary, on the ground that ERISA preemption prohibits application of California’s community property law. Emard appealed. We have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We hold that ERISA preemption does not bar the application of the California law on which Emard relies and that removal was improper. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to remand to state court.