Kulas

Theodore Chester Kulas appeals the judgment of the district court in favor of defendants in his civil action for forced medication with antipsychotic drugs.

FACTS

Kulas was charged by the State of Arizona with crimes involving dealing in drugs. On April 22, 1993 there was a hearing in the Superior Court of Pima County before Howard Hantman, Judge Pro Tempore, as to Kulas’s competency to stand trial. Kulas was represented by appointed counsel. Two appointed experts reported that he was incompetent. The court orally found him incompetent, adding “but there is substantial probability he will be restored to competency within a reasonable period of time.” The court committed him to “the Maricopa County Department of Health Services, Madison Street Jail ... attention Dr. Jack Potts.” The court orally declared: “It is the order of the Court he be evaluated at that facility for a period of 45 days....” The court set a status conference for June 8 and orally directed counsel “to contact Dr. Potts or the other treating physician before the June 8th status conference to obtain telephonically the status of the defendant’s competency and progress, if any, at the facility.” In a minute order…

concurring.

I agree wholeheartedly with Judge Noo-nan’s conclusion that Dr. Hoffert is entitled at least to qualified immunity. I write separately, however, because I bebeve—as did *457 the district court — -that a strong ease can be made for the proposition that Dr. Hoffert is entitled also to quasi-judicial immunity, which is absolute. When all is said and done, Kulas is suing the doctor for doing what he was expected to do pursuant to Judge Hant-man’s valid order. Such behavior falls squarely within the rule that officials implementing valid court orders are immune for their conduct in so doing.

This circuit has repeatedly stated that quasi-judicial immunity protects those who execute [state] court orders from liability in civil rights actions, and we have so held in Coverdell v. Dep’t of Social and Health Services, 834 F.2d 758, 764 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 , 65 n. 6 (9th Cir.1974); Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir.1969); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir.1965)). Moreover, we are not alone. “Other circuits have held that persons who faithfully execute valid court orders are absolutely immune from liability…

dissenting.

I do not believe that the forced medication of Mr. Kulas can reasonably be seen as falling within the scope of Judge Hantman’s orders. Accordingly, Dr. Hoffert’s actions are not entitled to either qualified or quasi-judicial immunity.

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court enunciated principles for de-eiding when the acts of a government official are entitled to qualified immunity:

The Court stated that the limits of qualified immunity should be defined in objective terms, with the reasonableness of an official’s conduct measured by reference to clearly established law. Id. at 818-19 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 . If the law at the time an action occurred was not clearly established, “an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.” Id. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 . However,'“[i]f the law was clearly established, the' immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Id. at 818-19 , 102 S.Ct.…