Nasca

We dismiss these appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction and direct the magistrate to withdraw his remand order and fee award because the parties did not manifest consent in the manner required by 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(b). We conclude that general orders from a district court that allow the court to infer consent from a failure to object are insufficient to manifest consent.

This ease began as a divorce proceeding in California Superior Court. It found its way to federal court after Peter Nasca, one of the divorcing spouses, joined his pension plan, Peoplesoft, in the action. Peoplesoft, citing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), removed the action to federal court. Having arrived in the District Court for the Northern District of California, the case was assigned to a magistrate judge. Responding to a motion by the Nascas, the magistrate judge ultimately remanded the action to state court and granted the Nascas’ request for attorneys’ fees. On appeal, Peo- *579 plesoft seeks to overturn the remand order and fee award.

Noting the lack of express consent in the record to the magistrate’s authority, we raised sua sponte the question of…