The defendants in this securities class action lawsuit seek a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s order for limited discovery. We hold that the order violated the discovery stay provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and grant the writ.

I

The plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit alleging violations of federal and state securities law. The complaint alleges that on the morning of October 8, 1997, Rational Software Corporation (“Rational”) Chief Executive Officer Paul Levy told SG Cow-en Securities Corporation (“Cowen”) analyst Rehan Syed that Rationales earnings would be lower than expected. Syed then allegedly alerted Cowen’s customers, who in turn began selling Rational shares. Rational’s stock price, which began the trading day at $15 % deteriorated to $11 % by mid-afternoon when trading in Rational stock was halted. The stock price continued its downward spiral the following day, closing near $9 per share. Trading vol *911 ume was unusually high; on the day of the Syed conversation, volume increased fivefold over Rational’s three-month daily average. Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against defendants Rational, Levy, Cowen, and Syed days later.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action, contending that the plaintiffs had failed to plead the requisite scienter and personal benefit elements sufficiently to state a section 10(b) violation, and that the complaint did not state a cause of action under California securities law because privity was not alleged. The district court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs had not provided any factual basis for their contention that Levy had received a personal benefit for tipping Syed, and that the complaint did not contain any facts demonstrating that Syed knew or should have known that the disclosure constituted a fiduciary breach. The court granted plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for leave to take limited discovery for the purpose of uncovering facts to support their allegations. The court granted the request, and defendants filed this petition for a writ of mandate.

II

At issue in this case is the scope of the discovery stay under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“Act”), Pub.L. No. 104-67 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et. seq.). The Act was passed in response to several perceived abuses in securities litigation, including discovery abuses. As the Third Circuit recently observed:

In re0 Advanta Corp. Secs. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 530-31 (3d Cir.1999).

The Act’s reforms included the institution of heightened pleading standards. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(l)-(2) (West Supp.1999); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. at 41 (1995) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. Sess. 740. In addition, the Act mandated a stay of discovery during the pendency of a summary judgment or dismissal motion. Section 78u-4(b)(3)(B) provides:

15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1999).

This section was “intended to prevent unnecessary imposition of discovery costs on defendants.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. Sess. 731. As the House and Senate managers further noted in their Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference:

Id. at 736.

In this case, plaintiffs requested discovery to learn the identity of Rational traders on October 8, 1998, and to determine the nature of the relationship between Cowen and Rational. They argued that failing to allow the requested discovery would shield the defendants from liability, causing them the “undue prejudice” contemplated by § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).

In granting the discovery motion in part, the district court reasoned that:

Applying the test, the district court then explained:

The district court thereupon permitted plaintiffs to propound ten interrogatories upon Cowen to inquire into the relationship between Levy and Cowen, and permitted plaintiffs to issue subpoenas on the NASD and brokerage firms to determine who sold Rational shares on October 8, 1997. The court denied the rest of the motion for discovery because it was not sufficiently particularized.

Distilled to its essence, the district court granted plaintiffs leave to conduct discovery so that they might uncover facts sufficient to satisfy the Act’s pleading requirements. This is not a permissible reason for lifting the discovery stay under the Act. As we plainly stated in Medhekar v. United States Dist. Ct.:

99 F.3d 325 , 328 (9th Cir.1996).

The “Stay of Discovery” provision of the Act clearly contemplates that “dis *913 covery should be permitted in securities class actions only after the court has sustained the legal sufficiency of the complaint” S.Rep. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 693 (emphasis added). The Act requires the trial court to dismiss the complaint if it fails to satisfy the Act’s heightened pleading standards. See § 78u-4(b)(3)(A). Thus, as a matter of law, failure to muster facts sufficient to meet the Act’s pleading requirements cannot constitute the requisite “undue prejudice” to the plaintiff justifying a lift of the discovery stay under § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). To so hold would contravene the purpose of the Act’s heightened pleading standards. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court clearly erred in granting the limited discovery request. 1

Ill

Determining that the district court erred in granting the discovery request does not end our inquiry, for we must also consider whether issuance of a writ of mandamus is appropriate. Mandamus is “an extraordinary remedy limited to exceptional circumstances.” Wilson v. United States Dist. Ct., 103 F.3d 828 , 829 (9th Cir.1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The burden is on the petitioner to show that his right to the writ is “clear and indisputable.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 103 F.3d 72 , 74 (9th Cir.1996).

We apply a five-factor test, first articulated in Bauman v. United States Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.1977), to determine whether the exercise of its mandamus jurisdiction is proper. See United States v. Amlani, 169 F.3d 1189, 1193-94 (9th Cir.1999). The factors are:

Amlani, 169 F.3d at 1193-94 . The factors should be weighed together based on the facts of the individual case. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1377 , 143 L.Ed.2d 535 (1999).

Here, application of the Bauman factors demonstrates that the writ should be granted. First, defendants have no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired. They may not directly appeal the discovery order because discovery orders are not final, appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . See Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir.1989). Appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) is unavailable because the district court did not certify the issue for appellate review. See 28 U.S.C. A. § 1292(b) (West Supp.1999). Neither does Federal Rule of Procedure 54(b) apply, as this rule applies to situations in which final judgment is entered as to some but not all claims or parties. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Although Cowen could refuse to comply with the discovery orders directed at it and then appeal from the contempt order, the majority of discovery is directed at third-parties who could not be expected to do so. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1(SJ), 31 F.3d 826, 829 *914 (9th Cir.1994). Thus, the first Bauman factor indicates that the defendants have no other adequate remedy.

Second, a petitioner is damaged or prejudiced if his claim will be moot on appeal. Compliance with a discovery order moots an appeal of that order. See Medhekar v. United States Dist. Ct., 99 F.3d 325 , 326-27 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, the second Bauman factor also indicates that the petition should be granted.

Third, as we have previously discussed, the district court clearly erred in holding that a plaintiff may obtain discovery under the undue prejudice exception to 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(3)(B) in order to plead a sufficient complaint.

Fourth, defendants concede that the district court’s order is not an “oft-repeated error” that “manifests persistent disregard of the federal rules.” Fifth, plaintiffs concede that there is “scant appellate authority addressing the Act” and so that the order raises issues of first impression.

In short, four of the five Bauman factors suggest that the petition be granted. Only the fourth — whether the district court’s order is an “oft-repeated error”— suggests otherwise, but this court has noted that “[t]he fourth and fifth Bauman factors are rarely, if ever, present at the same time.” Amlani, 169 F.3d at 1194 .

Accordingly, we conclude the writ should issue.

PETITION GRANTED

. We also reject plaintiffs’ argument that the district court should have permitted discovery because plaintiffs asserted state claims. As the district court correctly explained, “Congress' attempt to address [concerns of discov-eiy abuse] would be rendered meaningless if securities plaintiffs could circumvent the stay simply by asserting pendent state law claims in federal court in conjunction with their federal law claims.”