Lajoie

Lajoie v. Thompson

Good Law
2000 Daily Journal DAR 1170·201 F.3d 1166·2000 WL 95935·53 Fed. R. Serv. 626·2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 741
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJanuary 31, 2000No. 98-35919California11,421 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Tashima, J.

Oregon state prisoner Clinton K. LaJoie appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , challenging his conviction for rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse of a minor child, “VN”. 1 LaJoie contends that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when evidence of VN’s past sexual abuse by others was excluded, pursuant to Oregon’s rape shield law, Oregon Evidence Code, Rule 412 (“Rule 412”), for failure to give the required 15-day notice of intent to introduce such evidence. 2 Because the exclusion of the evidence was contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, the district court erred in denying the petition. We therefore reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

LaJoie was accused of sexually abusing, orally sodomizing, and raping his housemate Jackie Williams’ niece, VN, when she was approximately seven and eight years old. VN resided with LaJoie and Williams at the time of the alleged sexual assaults. Uncontested evidence shows that VN had been sexually abused by several others and raped by one other man in unrelated incidents. In addition, the Children’s Services Division’s (“CSD”) case…

Dissenting Opinion

Ferguson, J.

dissenting:

The majority opinion contains several fundamental errors. First, the majority incorrectly determines that the evidence Clinton LaJoie (“LaJoie”) sought to put before the jury is relevant. Second, the majority errs in finding that LaJoie’s interests in introducing the evidence outweigh those of the State in precluding it. Even worse, it has effectively carved out an exception to a rape shield statute’s notice requirement whenever a defendant victimizes a child. Finally, assuming that the state courts have committed constitutional error, the majority mistakenly identifies it as one that warrants habeas relief. For these reasons, I dissent.

I. Factual Background

From the time she was two years old until she was eight, VN’s life was a nightmare. While she lived with her mother, she was sexually assaulted by: (1) an older brother; (2) a thirteen-year old boy; (3) a fifty-year old man; and (4) a sex offender who also happened to be her mother’s boyfriend. After being forced to live in one home after another, she was sent to live with her aunt and her aunt’s boyfriend, LaJoie, at his isolated farm. VN was in the second grade.

Although VN had been a longtime victim of…

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