Bradshaw

Order; Dissent by

ORDER

In G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 156 F.3d 893 (9th Cir.1998), we held that California Labor Code provisions authorizing the state to seize money and impose penalties for a subcontractor’s failure to comply with prevailing wage requirements violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 904 . The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded “for further consideration in light of American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 , 119 S.Ct. 977 , 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999).” Bradshaw v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1450 , 143 L.Ed.2d 538 (1999). Having determined that Sullivan is fully consistent with our analysis, we reinstate the judgment and opinion.

DISCUSSION

Sullivan involved the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, under which an employer or its insurer must pay for all “reasonable” and “necessary” medical treatment for work-related injuries. See 119 S.Ct. at 982. Under the Pennsylvania scheme, an insurance company could withhold payment for medical treatment if it disputed the reasonableness or necessity of that treatment. See Pa. Stat. Ann. *943…

dissenting:

I dissented from the original opinion in this case because I do not believe that relations among contracting parties are governed by the Due Process Clause .merely because one of the parties happens to be a state. See G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 156 F.3d 893, 908 (1998) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). I continue to adhere to that view. But the Supreme Court has now directed us to reconsider our opinion in light of American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 , 119 S.Ct. 977 , 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). See Bradshaw v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1450 , 143 L.Ed.2d 538 (1999). In response, the majority reinstates its original opinion without amendment, claiming that its reasoning “fits comfortably within the analytic framework set forth in Sullivan.” Reinstatement Order at 1970. I must dissent once again, because Sullivan fits the majority’s rationale about as comfortably as Cinderella’s slipper on the wicked step-sister’s foot.

Sullivan teaches that, to state a claim for relief under section 1983, G & G must identify both an alleged constitutional deprivation and a state actor who is responsible for it. See Sullivan, 119 S.Ct. at…