Lewis

Dissenting:

“[0]nly the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 , 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). In these cases, the deprivations of shelter were necessary and the alleged deprivations of adequate food, water and sanitation were not wanton. I therefore dissent.

Shelter

It is well-settled that “[p]rison officials should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline to maintain institutional security.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322 , 106 S.Ct. 1078 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)) (emphasis added). Indeed, we have held that “prison officials have a right and a duty to take the necessary steps to reestablish order in a prison when such order is lost.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1259 (9th Cir.1982) (emphasis added). The deference accorded to prison officials “extends to a prison security measure taken in response to an actual confrontation with riotous inmates, just as it does to…

Opinion by Judge W. FLETCHER; Dissent by Judge SNEED.

These class actions arose from two disturbances in the Arizona State Prison in Safford, Arizona: one in August 1995 and the other in December of the same year. Although the district court resolved the cases separately, we consolidate them because they are factually similar and present identical legal issues. In each case, prison officials quelled the disturbance and then held all of the inmates in the affected unit out-of-doors while they investigated the incident and searched the prison buildings. The appellants, two classes of plaintiffs consisting of the inmates who were held outside, brought class actions against Arizona prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , asserting that the conditions under which they were held violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant prison officials in each case. We conclude that unresolved issues of fact preclude summary judgment in both cases. We therefore reverse and remand.

I

Because these cases were resolved at summary judgment, we relate the facts in the light most favorable to the…