Gorbach

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court, which is joined in full by Chief Judge HUG, Judge BROWNING, Judge SCHROEDER, Judge O’SCANNLAIN, Judge GRABER, and Judge WARDLAW.

We must decide whether the power to confer citizenship through the process of naturalization necessarily includes the power to revoke that citizenship. We conclude that it does not.

Facts.

Traditionally new citizens have been naturalized in court. The governing statute used to confer exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize persons as citizens on district courts, territorial courts, and state courts of record. 1 This was changed in 1990. Now “[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States is conferred upon the Attorney General.” 2 Courts may administer the oath of citizenship. 3 The oath is an essential element in the process of becoming a naturalized citizen, conducted in a public ceremony. 4 Some district courts arrange a memorable occasion, with welcomes from civic groups, and distribution by an INS agent of certificates of naturalization, but the power to naturalize plainly was shifted by the 1990 amendment from the courts to the INS.

Before the amendment,…

with whom Judges BROWNING, T.G. NELSON, HAWKINS, and TASHIMA join, concurring:

I agree that the preliminary injunction should be affirmed. I write separately because I believe that when we review an administrative agency’s construction of the statute it administers, the proper analytical framework is dictated by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), as recently explained in Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1291 , 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000). Applying that examination to the issues in this case, I conclude that Congress has unambiguously expressed its statutory intent. Therefore, there is no need to determine whether the agency’s construction is reasonable.

Under Chevron, we must consider first “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 . “If Congress has done so, the inquiry is at an end; the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’ ” Brown & Williamson, — U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 1300 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 , 104 S.Ct. 2778…