Roosevelt

Opinion by Judge O’SCANNLAIN; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent *1034 by Judge REINHARDT; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge SCHWARZER.

In this bankruptcy case, we must decide whether a good faith transferee gave property of value in exchange for property conveyed to her by a debtor in an otherwise avoidable transfer.

I

On July 10, 1989, Steven and Judy Roosevelt executed a marriage settlement agreement (“MSA”) purporting to transmute various community and separate property interests into the separate property of each. Steven transferred to Judy his community interest in the family home (“Glendora real property”) and his separate interest in a partnership share of the Glendora Medical Investment Company (“GMIC”). 2 In exchange, Judy gave Steven her community interest in his medical practice and her community interest in his legal education.

On November 9, 1990, Steven filed for bankruptcy. In April 1992, the bankruptcy trustee and appellee in this case, David Ray, brought this action against Steven and Judy Roosevelt as well as Ronald Si-gurson seeking to avoid the transfers of the Glendora property and the GMIC share to Judy on the grounds that they were…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority’s holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that the conveyance of the Glendora real property was avoidable as a § 547 preference transfer. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the new bankruptcy judge did not exceed the scope of the BAP’s mandate when he determined anew the nature of the properties involved. The record makes clear that the nature of the properties in which Ms. Roosevelt *1041 transferred her interests had already been finally resolved, and that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court was limited by the BAP’s mandate to determining the value of her community interest. The bankruptcy court and the BAP had previously held that Ms. Roosevelt possessed a community interest in her former husband’s medical practice and legal education. Nevertheless, the new bankruptcy judge determined not the value, but the nature of her interest in the relevant property. Accordingly, in my opinion, we are required to reverse and remand with directions to the bankruptcy court that it carry out the previous mandate — that it determine the actual value of the property transferred…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in all of Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion except section IV.B.l remanding for the trial judge to clarify his ruling regarding the value of Judy’s interest in the medical practice.

The bankruptcy court held that Judy gave no value by relinquishing her interest in the medical practice. We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 744 (9th Cir.1997). Indeed, the trial court’s decision “must be affirmed if correct, even if the court relied on the wrong grounds or reasons.” Claar v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 29 F.3d 499 , 501 n. 1 (9th Cir.1994). Because I believe the bankruptcy court reached the correct result, I would affirm.

As Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion recognizes, op. at 9805-06, because § 548(c) is an affirmative defense, Judy had the burden of proving the value she gave. See Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A, 916 F.2d 528 , 535 (9th Cir.1990). It is not enough to state that under California law, when community efforts increase the value of a separate property business, the increase belongs to the community. See Dekker v. Dekker, 17 Cal.App.4th 842, 851 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 642…