Matson

Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co. v. Matson

Good Law
2000 Daily Journal DAR 10105·226 F.3d 1015·2000 A.M.C. 2913·2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7595·2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22896
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitSeptember 12, 2000No. 99-16031California1,998 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

PER CURIAM Opinion; Concurrence by Judge D.W. NELSON

James Matson appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dissolve a stay of parallel state court proceedings regarding a personal injury suit brought by a former employee. Matson’s suit, brought in state court under the Jones Act, stemmed from injuries suffered while working on the “Anchor Scow,” a vessel owned by Ross.

Ross Island, as owner pro hoc vice of the Anchor Scow, brought this federal proceeding in admiralty to limit its liability under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. The district court found that Matson had failed to make the necessary stipulations to dissolve the injunction on parallel proceedings, and denied Matson’s motion. Matson now appeals, arguing that: (1) the Limitation of Liability Act is to be applied very narrowly; (2) that a single claimant should not be *1017 required to stipulate to the adequacy of its opponent’s bond. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action involves a dispute regarding, parallel state and admiralty proceedings. On March 16, 1997, James Matson, an employee of Ross Island, was injured while aboard the “Anchor Scow” vessel. On March…

Concurring Opinion

Nelson, J.

Concurring:

I believe the rule in Newton v. Shipman, 718 F.2d 959 (1983) (per curiam), as it affects single-claimant cases stipulating to the value of the vessel, is bad law and should be reconsidered.

Newton’s requirement of stipulating to the value of the vessel and its cargo — in order to lift an injunction under the single claimant exception — does not have any statutory basis. Neither 46 U.S.C. § 183 (a) nor Fed.R.Civ.P. Supp. R. F requires this stipulation. In following the Eighth Circuit’s precedents, Newton conflicts with and made no attempt to distinguish prior Ninth Circuit precedent. Indeed, Anderson v. Nadon, 360 F.2d 53 (1966) noted that stipulating to the value of the vessel is not required in order to maintain a state court action:

Id. at 58 n. 8 (citations omitted). If Newton truly established a new Ninth Circuit rule, it should have addressed Anderson . An intracircuit conflict is grounds for en banc review. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Company, 810 F.2d 1477, 1478-9 (9th Cir.1987)(en banc) (“the appropriate mechanism for resolving an irreconcilable conflict is an en banc decision. A panel faced with such a conflict must call for en *1019 banc review, which…

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